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The project of bio-cartography interconnected the mta orphoses of subjectivity with the 
progress of representational thought, having drawn on the different fields of reflections concerned with 
the changing self: poststructuralist philosophies, f minist theories, studies of science and technology, 
linguistics, postcolonial and social sciences. Thus, through its title, this paper established the intr-
relations between theory, science, and art practice. Th  ubiquitous notion of representation (hence its 
different variations: figuration and transfiguration) was examined on the ground of bio-art works, and 
various exemplifications became not only illustrations of presented ideas, but also dynamic mappings 
of vivid metamorphoses. 
The attempt was to prepare new tools which facilitate he reception of new class of portraits, 
which I called ‘bio-portraits’. The concept of the bio-portrait was born on the crossroads of the 
philosophical reappraisal of the representational approach, the etymological roots which came from 
different origins and the background of bio-technological development. My aim was to show that the 
art practice no longer represents reality, but it transfigures and transcends it. Therefore, my analysis 
showed the presented works as effects of sociopolitical power relations and the way of their 
transformations, having opened possibilities of two-directional way of cooperation between theory and 




El proyecto de biocartografía ha interconectado las metamorfosis de la subjetividad con el 
progreso del pensamiento representacional, inspirado en los diferentes campos de pensamiento 
relacionados con el cambio en sí: filosofías postestructuralistas, teorías feministas, estudios científicos 
y tecnológicos, la lingüística y ciencias postcoloniales y sociales. A través de su título, este trabajo 
establece las relaciones entre teoría, ciencia y la práctica del arte. Se ha examinado la noción ubicua de 
la representación (de ahí sus variaciones: figuración and transfiguración) basándose en obras de bio-
arte, y varias ejemplificaciones se convirtieron no sólo en ilustraciones de las ideas representadas sino 
también en estructuras dinámicas de metamorfosis viva . 
La idea fue preparar nuevas herramientas que facilitan a recepción de una nueva clase de 
retratos, los cuales llamo ‘biorretratos’. El concepto de biorretratos ha nacido del cruce de la 
revaloración filosófica con el acercamiento representacional, de las raíces etimológicas que provienen 
de diferentes orígenes y del fondo de desarrollo biotecnológico. Mi propósito fue indicar que la 
práctica del arte ya no representa la realidad, sino al contrario la transfigura y la transciende. Por
consiguiente, mi análisis ha indicado los trabajos presentados como consecuencia de las relaciones de 
poder en un contexto sociopolítico y el camino de sus transformaciones, dando mas posibilidades en la 
creación de un camino bidireccional de cooperación entre la teoría y la práctica, la ciencia y el arte, la 
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We have been living in times of advanced metamorphoses. The challenges that we face 
are fast-changing and they require a considerable amount of thought to the permanent high-
tech development. 
 
These are strange times, and strange things are happening. Times of ever-expanding, yet 
spasmodic, waves of change, which engender the simultaneous occurrence of 
contradictory effects. Times of fast-moving changes which do not wipe out the brutality 
of power-relations, but in many ways intensify them and bring them to the point of 
implosion. (Braidotti 2002: 1) 
 
Throughout the progress of philosophical thought, after three wounds of the Western human 
(the Copernican, the Darwinian, and the Freudian), the notion of subject/ivity has gone into 
pieces (Haraway 2008). Different — centripetal and centrifugal — forces interplay in the 
process of the structural transformation of the subject, which becomes a kaleidoscope, 
a fusion of experiences, memories, dreams, and possibilities immersed in various subsystems 
and arranged into power-relations interacting today: technological, religious, political; class, 
gender, and age-based, etc. Furthermore, the intensfied brutality of inner and outer 
hierarchies has brought them to the point of implosion, as Rosi Braidotti notes.  
Hence the vision of the subject has changed, throug the “permanent processes of 
transition, hybridization and nomadization” (Braidotti 2002: 2), from a stable unity of being 
to a dynamic and changing entity. The proliferation of multiple identities is followed by the 
proliferation of discourses about those identities, and it is not only a quantitative 
multiplication, but rather a qualitative one (Braidotti 2006: 94). Again, following Braidotti: 
“Contrary to those who fear that the proliferation f micro-discourses will result in a realistic 
drift into nihilism1, I see this process as productive of new and more adequate accounts of our 
being-in-the-world” (Ibid.: 18). 
                                                           
1 More about a drift into Thanatic fixation in chapter 4. 
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The established mode of representation has become a historical condition submitted to 
theoretical discussion. Theoretical debates deeply rooted in poststructuralism have shown that 
representation does not give Others the possibility of expression (Spivak 1988). More 
specifically, psychoanalysis claims that representation is only the ectypal product of acquiring 
subjectivity; moreover, it is a phallogocentric system, where there is no place for any other 
subject. Further hierarchies (such as subject-object, nature-culture, etc.) are linked to this 
“patriarchal, Oedipal familial narratives” (Braidotti 2006: 57; see also Irigaray 1985). Thus, 
I believe that feminist theories will stand as a renovation, redefinition and reappraisal of the 
web of interrelations between subjects and representatio s in the light of techno-
transformation. 
Therefore, my attempt is to interconnect the metamorph ses of subjectivity with the 
progress of representational thought, drawing on the different fields of reflections concerned 
with the changing self: feminist theories, studies of science and technology, linguistics, 
postcolonial and social sciences. Through its title, this paper establishes the inter-connections 
between theory, science, and art practice. The ubiquitous notion of representation (hence its 
different variations: figuration and transfiguration) will be examined on the ground of bio-art 
works, and various exemplifications will become notonly illustrations of presented ideas, but 
also dynamic mappings of vivid metamorphoses. I would like to emphasize not only the 
conceptual framework of a cartographical approach, but also the importance of stylistics. 
Deleuzian philosophical nomadology is seen “as a variation on the theme of écriture 
féminine” (Braidotti 2002: 97); thus, my contribution also uses creativity as a dominant mode 
of expression. 
 
1.2. Initial hypothesis 
 
What is central to my project is the notion of representation. After a series of radical 
deconstructions, the category itself seems no longer vital for the mimetic paradigm. My 
primary aim is to scrutinize the shift from “subject-object” positioning to “subject-subject” 
relation. The latter is present in the process of (self-)portraying, particularly in the domain of 
bio-art, inevitable focal point of which is always a reflection on the changing role of art in 
thinking about the importance of science and technology in inter-subject relations. 
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The main research question is: how is the body involved and transformed in the 
interconnection of science and art practice, evolving in the process of representing itself, self-
portraying? Therefore, I want to include a secondary question: how is the notion of 
representation being changed within the passage of two big paradigms —the linguistic and the 
material one? I will show different bodily functions in contemporary art: functions as 
a sign/symbol/cultural representation, and matter as such. The main question will inevitably 





The research is necessarily interdisciplinary and, lthough it is focused on contemporary 
art works (made not only by women), its aim is to re-read bio-art through the lens of 
philosophical and literary theory united into feminist studies lineage. The art works will be 
seen then as a result of discursive production (process of culturally acquiring subjectivity and 
its representation) as well as material dimension of used bodies (one of the common features 
of various bio-projects is their thematic connection with a phenomenon of life formulated in 
the context of biology and biotechnology). 
Such a frame supports the project of laying the foundation for the new transdisciplinary 
overview of artistic practice. By becoming not only a synchro- and diachronic marker, but 
inevitably a philosophical reflection, it is taking into account the scientific knowledge about 
the metamorphoses of subject and representation corresponding with that subject-in-
becoming. 
I will work with different areas of contemporary feminist theory in order to bring them 
close to bio-art practice. They will be linked together in a shape of non-linear cartography of 
current debates dedicated to the new kinds of subject exceeding “the norm, the norm-al, the 
norm-ative view” (Braidotti 2006: 32) of them. More specifically, I will engage the new 
material philosophy represented mainly by Braidotti (deeply rooted in Deleuzian thought) to 
support my reflections about alternative subjectivities, which exist on the border between 
living/nonliving, grown/constructed, born/manufactured, and object/subject. These ideas will 
be completed with feminist science studies (Donna Haraway, Evelyn Fox-Keller), which try 
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to break up the debate about stability of nature opposed to abnormal, non-normative hybridity 
and take on the far more serious challenge of joining scientific and cultural discourses with 
the ethical insight.  
 
1.3. Structure  
 
My work is divided into three chapters, where the first two correspond together and 
stand as a theoretical apparatus. The compression of reflections about bio-technology as 
a fantasy and as a field of science includes a reassessment of systems of representation, 
interlaced with theorized statements of bio-artists that provide the basis of further analysis of 
particular artistic exemplifications. The attempt is to prepare new tools which facilitate the 
reception of a new class of portraits, which I call ‘bio-portraits’. The concept of the bio-
portrait was born on the crossroads of the philosophical reappraisal of the representational 
approach, the etymological roots which come from different origins and the background of 
bio-technological development. I will display the artistic exemplification of affinity with other 
organic and mechanic phenomena, ranging from the most stable scans of human interior to 
the mutual, inter-bodily union of human and non-human, mediated by the technological 
apparatus. The detailed analysis of certain art works (Marta de Menezes, Frederik de Wilde, 
Eduardo Kac, Stelarc, Marc Quinn) will be provided in a frame of categorization of various 
cross-referring issues. The visual analysis will close my reflections and provide conclusions.  
The second chapter indicates the synchro- and diachronic location of the bio-art works, 
drawing on a quasi-scientific approach of teratology arisen in antiquity and contemporary 
development of genetics. It also deals with a challenge of defining the ‘bio-art’ and shows 
different phases of evolution which join bio-technological apparatus with artistic imaginary. 
The third chapter deals with the second big notion used in my work — the concept of 
representation. It examines the etymology of the notio  of representation, using tools of 
comparative linguistic studies — the comparison of etymology (originated from different 
languages) of notions related to referents included within the category of representation, so 
then: a (self-) portrait, an image, a mask, etc. By working on differences and similarities 
between categories of representation and figuration, I will compare various definitions and 
conceptions of representation functioning within feminist theory. Finally, the fourth chapter 
becomes a confrontation of the previously prepared evolution of my theoretical apparatus 
5 
with the newest bio-art realizations. It includes the introduction of the artists, whose works are 
subjects of my analysis. The examination of their works will expose different strategies of 
bio-portrayal, and critical remarks towards non-human representation included within the part 


























And yet, we want so much to see, don’t we? 
To see! We want: to see!  
Perhaps we have never had any other will than to see 
[dautre vouloir que voir]? 




2.1. Synchro- and diachronic drawing on the bio-art location 
 
The dream from movies like Gattaca (1997), AI (2001) or La piel que habito (2011) has 
come true. Practices of transgenesis or eugenesis may not be so common, but are undoubtedly 
present in everyday life. Moreover, now they are being used even for artistic purposes. 
Nowadays, not only has cosmetic and plastic surgery become common, but fantasies of 
Frankenstein origin become reality (as well as others, such as: the ancient Greek chimera, 
Bosch’s allegorical and moralist medieval paintings and Wells’s vivisection parable The 
Island of Dr. Moreau, the figure of Robocop, Lara Croft, et al.). They have always expressed 
and will always express an anxiety over nature2.  
After the end of the somatophobic dimension of our culture, which had ended with the 
Freudian revolution, we entered into a ‘biotechnological century’ (Bakke 2011). Recently 
scholars have noticed that “interest in biotechnology ha[d] been increasing in the humanities 
and social sciences, causing a proliferation of specific case studies of individual technologies 
or particular processes” (Landecker 2005). The most visible signs of this shift are presented 
on artistic ground, wherein we can observe: 
                                                           
2 The notion of ‘nature’ has been already problematized by Bruno Latour (2009) and Donna Haraway (2008, 
2010). See also a very apt categorization of the classic concept of nature, which — according to Andrew Light 
— is based on 1) separation from human and civilization; 2) wilderness of citizens — beasts; 3) superiority of 
civilized human (1995: 197). 
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[…] some major currents of the relationship between the arts and the techno-sciences, the 
trend of the coming together of nature and (new) technologies, the continuous evolution 
of the link between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, and the glimpse of a new real […]. It seems 
[…] to be a vision opening onto a new worldview. (Shapiro 2010 [4.04.2011]) 
 
But now it is not only a myth, prediction, or wishful thinking — as some people have read 
early texts of cyberfeminists3. In the world of oncomouse, GMO, and advanced prosthetics 
there is no longer a place for biophobia or technopa ic. Interestingly, this “development has 
stimulated debate over whether feminism may be seenas ‘biophobic’ in its past treatment or 
exclusion of the biological, or whether the new materi lists have over-emphasized this point” 
(Twine 2010: 402). I will talk more about the feminist approach to biotechnological 
metamorphoses of societies later on, but it is worth underlying the atmosphere of reluctance 
to bodily interventions. Therefore, the body had been treated before as a closed container, 
regarding material and spiritual/linguistic/performative/social displays4. As I have already 
mentioned before, the postmodern turn showed that the container had cracks, and it is not so 
impermeable. There were certain steps of mining this ‘Ark of Unity’. 
After the three wounds of the Western human —the Copernican, the Darwinian, and the 
Freudian— it is time to accomplish the fourth turn, the IT or cyborgian one, which “infolds 
organic and technological flesh and so melds that Great Divide as well” (Haraway 2008: 12). 
The Great Divides are synonymous to investigation by deconstruction (understood as 
a methodological approach), binarisms — sets of opposites, which are always hierarchical, 
one of the notions is superior, the other less important, less visible, always ‘less than’. So 
then, we have the antithetical juxtapositions of woman/man, animal/human, nature/culture, 
organic/technical, and wild/domestic, etc. The binarisms which organize the patriarchal 
system give a privilege to men and set up a normative, hierarchical way of constructing power 
relations in societies. Derrida’s deconstruction offers a method of subverting those 
oppositional constructions by inverting them in thefirst phase and creating of a new concept, 
emerging in the second phase, which replaces the previous hierarchy (Derrida 1987: 41-42)5. 
As we will see on the art exemplifications, “new suba tonomous entities located at the fuzzy 
border between the living/nonliving, grown/construced, born/manufactured, and 
                                                           
3 See mainly the iconic text of Sadie Plant (1997).  
4 It is quite interesting that in 1995 Elizabeth Grosz saw body as a “concrete, material, animate organization of 
flesh, organs, nerves, skeletal structure and substances, which are given a unity and cohesiveness throug  
psychical and social inscription of the body's surface” (1995: 104). Although she differentiates the two layers of 
bodily activities: inscriptive and phenomenological, she still treats the wholeness as a stable construction.  
5 See more about the deconstructive method of overcoming binarisms within the field of gender in Rodríguez 
Salas (2006). 
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object/subject” (Kac (ed.) 2007: 232), were created by scientists and artists to overcome those 
rough borders. 
In Deleuzian terms an art “has the power not to represent the world or located subjects, 
but to imagine create and vary affects that are not already given” (Colebrook 2002: 103). In 
this vein, art works have the possibilities to offer visions of new phenomena which go beyond 
the images of human as the crown of all beings, the king of ratio. Donna Haraway explains 
how the mechanism of putting categories in binary order works6: 
 
How would we sort things out? Canid, hominid; pet, professor; bitch, woman; animal, 
human; athlete, handler. One of us has a microchip injected under her neck skin for 
identification; the other has a photo ID California driver’s license. One of us has a written 
record of her ancestors for twenty generations; onef us does not know her great 
grandparents’ names. One of us, product of a vast genetic mixture, is called “purebred”. 
One of us, equally a product of a vast mixture, is called “white.” Each of these names 
designates a different r a c i a l  d i s c o u r s e, and we both inherit their consequences in 
our flesh. (2008: 15; emphasis mine) 
 
Rearranging the oppositions can be done by means of human imagination, as Colebrook 
points Deleuzian ideas out:  
 
The human becomes more than itself, or expands to it highest power, not by affirming its 
humanity, nor by returning to animal state, but by becoming-hybrid with what is not 
itself. This creates ‘lines of flight’; from life itself we imagine all the becomings of life, 
using the human power of imagination to overcome the human. (Colebrook 2002; 129) 
 
The noteworthy question, showing the power of imagin tion, was finally (or already?) 
asked in 1988 by Vile’m Flusser (in his column “Curie’s Children”, for the magazine 
Artforum): 
 
Why is it that dogs aren’t yet blue with red spots, and that horses don’t yet radiate 
phosphorescent colors over the nocturnal meadows of the land? Why hasn’t the breeding 
of animals, still principally an economic concern, moved into the field of aesthetics? 
 
                                                           
6 However, Haraway strongly criticizes Deleuzian notion of becoming and tries to ground it within indivi ual 
struggles: “But the category ‘companion species’ is less shapely and more rambunctious than that. Indeed, I find 
that notion, which is less a category than a pointer to an ongoing ‘becoming with’, to be a much richer web to 
inhabit than any of the posthumanisms on display after (or in reference to) the ever-deferred demise of Man” 
(2008: 16).  
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Breeding of animals and flowers has already moved into the field of aesthetics. Moreover, 
biotechnological has replaced traditional artistic techniques, and now they are used to 
‘produce’ new kind of entities.  
 
2.1.1. Teratology and hybridity 
 
Teratology, a new scientific subgenre, shows that ‘identity trouble’7 always existed, but 
has not always caused fear. The Greek etymology of the word tera/teratos presents two 
interpretations: it refers both to a prodigy and to a demon. It is something which evokes both 
horror and fascination, aberration and adoration. It is simultaneously holy and hellish, sacred 
and profane (Braidotti 1996b: 136) and it has been still present in the contemporary approach 
to the prospect of becoming posthuman, which evokes terror and excites pleasure at the same 
time (Hayles 1999: 283). Fascination has always accompanied the dimension of the uncanny, 
but the ancient strategy of merging aesthetics withmorality became the actual paradigm of 
dualist perception of the following concepts: ‘nature’ and ‘artifice’, ‘beauty’ and ‘ugliness’, 
‘norm’ and ‘deviancy’: 
 
An idealized notion of ‘beauty’ inherited from Greco-Roman art held sway in the West as 
an aesthetic guiding principle until the twentieth century, for the history of Western art 
can be seen as couched in the biologically normative representation of human and 
animals. In other words, traditionally, the representation of atypical life-forms was meant 
to reinforce the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant,’ and not to underline the 
continuity among all life. (Kac (ed.) 2007: 9) 
 
Throughout centuries, the attitude towards abnormal creatures has changed. According 
to the work of Braidotti (1997), we can sum up those turns, in the historical light, by stages: 
 
1) The monstrosity of Other is treated with curiosity and as a positive phenomenon, 
something wonderful (16th and 17th century); 
2) With the institution of the anatomy clinic, the monsters became the negative side 
of the norm, something ‘less than’; 
                                                           
7 Of course, I am referring to the ‘bible’ of gender studies — Gender Trouble by Judith Butler (1990), but 
concurrently changing one of the titled notions, I would like to open it for other subjects and avoid criticism, 
which was previously addressed towards this term. 
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3) Within feminist discourse there is a place for overcoming the negative way of 
seeing monsters. Following the Derridean deconstruction (see chapter 1), the logic 
of binary oppositions should be broken.  
 
The crucial feature of monstrosity is mentioned by Braidotti as an interconnection of the 
bodily and technological, and furthermore — I would add — between ‘humanness’ and other 
organisms. The next stage, to concretize very abstrct principles of feminist 
deconstructionism, unites various levels of social interactions. I will organize them into three 
dimensions: 1) theoretical (academic discourse), 2) artistic (practice, creation), 3) social 
response (actual change). 
Previous reflections and theories of subjectivity did not encompass the new 
‘technoreality’ and interactions between different kinds of organisms. The fluid subjectivity 
turned out not only a utopia, but ‘atopia’ as Elizabeth Grosz claims for: “[…] the atopic is not 
a definite place, but rather a non-place, an indeterminate place, but place and space 
nonetheless” (Grosz 2000: 215). Greek roots indicate that atopia is another dimension (atopos 
means different, strange). Also Bataille’s concept of heterology (from French adjective 
heterologue, which means sick tissues in anatomical pathology) treats about everything, what 
is evicted outside the norm, what is linked to madness and delirium (Bataille 1985). So then, 
for instance, Grosz’s concept of ‘atopia’ and Bataille’s heterology do mark a general shift in 
thought about identity, and frame so-called postmodern drift of differentiating subjects, rather 
than standardizing them. 
The contrast between the modern and the postmodern era8 made sense, “when you 
juxtaposed the era of the body organized by systems of production and reproduction, and the 
body organized by informatics” (Haraway 2009-2010: 4). I would say that this juxtaposition 
is marked by two flagship milestones: the work of Michel Foucault (mainly his History of 
Sexuality) and A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
                                                           
8 On the artistic ground the contrast is also signifcant. To put it roughly: the modernist definitions of art consist 
of aesthetic values, linear evolution, and consecrating of the avant-garde movements. However, the serie  of 
postmodernist changes have reevaluated the notion of originality and artistic irresponsibility: these 
transformations were oscillating mainly around conceptual dimension of art and free-floating ideas submerged 
into an intertextual grid. The postmodern transformations of artistic productions include the so-called anti-
institutional turn, which erases big institutions (museums, galleries, etc.) as only carriers of esteemed art works. 
But after anti-institutional objection, institutions as such have managed to remain platforms for critical positions. 
They have started to offer “a free space in which concepts as well as experiments in the contemporary 
production of art and culture can be tested and further developed — even when this can sometimes be 
confrontational, transgressive, or even shocking” (Horn 2012: 4). 
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Twentieth Century9 by early Haraway. The first one examines the modern mechanism of 
discipline, which sees the body as a machine in two dimensions: anatomico-metaphysical 
(rooted in Descartes) and techno-political (Foucault 1975: 136). The second — operating on 
a symbolic level — presents a cyborg as a metaphor of subjectivity after IT revolution. This 
way Haraway sees the cyborg simultaneously as a narr tive construction and living being, 
which moves beyond the traditional limitations of gender, and a myth of origin which is 
concerned with the Christian tradition and Oedipal constructions of relations between men 
and women: “Formed through a radical disruption of otherness, cyborg identity foregrounds 
the constructedness of otherness” (Balsamo 1996: 33); however, the identity of woman is 
explicitly mapped onto the image of the cyborg and this connotation recalls the traditional 
gender distinction and identifies the figure of woman with anxiety or even fear of the 
technological (see Brown 2011, Kakoudaki 2000). Nevertheless, after a very simplistic 
juxtaposition of woman with cyborg, the next turn — marked by reflections about companion 
species (Haraway 2008) — encircles the whole variety of subjects (including animals, plants, 
and entities ‘in-between’), whereby every entity is a hybrid (“no organism is a one” — as 
Haraway paraphrases a well-known sentence of Luce Irigaray; 2009-2010: 15). An effort to 
destabilize the opposition between nature and culture is highly visible, wherein authors are 
trying to break up the debate about stability of nature opposed to abnormal, non-normative 
hybridity. 
The postulate of, among others, Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin, is to place human 
and non-human subjects as equal participants on the same arena. They write: “the humanist 
concept of subjectivity is inseparable from the discourse and institution of speciesism which 
relies on tacit acceptance” (2007: 6), what implies an ethical postulate of reinforcing power 
relations: more reciprocity of human and non-human, than the binary opposition between men 
and women, so culture and nature (Hoving 2005: 157), and further: biology and technology. 
Furthermore, new hybrid-beings spring into existence. They are called 
‘technoteratogens’ (Kac (ed.) 2007: 88), and inhabit not only the lab world of genetic 
modifications, but also seen as unnatural, impure, and unstable, they become inheritors of 
ancient big mythical critters: 
 
                                                           
9 “A Cyborg Manifesto…” firstly appeared as “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” in Socialist Review 80 (1985); the 
revised version has been reprinted many times, among them in her major collection, Simians, Cyborgs, and 
Women: The Reinvention of Nature (Routledge, 1991), which includes other important essays. 
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Calling this construct transgenic gives it a dimensio  of endogenous abnormality, 
a hidden dimension that divulges the underlying pressure of degrading and impure 
procedures that engendered it. (Kac (ed.) 2007: 86-87) 
 
The mixture of fear and fascination still defines the attitude towards the unknown; hence, 
a clear hierarchy is founded upon the negative prefix. Moreover, this is the challenge for 
feminisms, because one of the main questions which t e feminist theories are struggling with 
is: “how can one free difference from the negative charge which it seems to have built into 
it?” (Braidotti 2002: 4). 
 
2.2. Marriage of science and art 
 
As I have already shown, my contribution combines present debates on visual art and its 
direct and indirect links to science with insights from gender studies and literary, cultural, 
postcolonial studies. In spite of the fact that the marriage between science and art is highly 
present on the ground of theoretical discussions (see especially the magazine L onardo and 
Leonardo Book Series published by MIT Press), there is a gap which should be fulfilled by 
the interdisciplinary analysis of the notion of repr sentation. By joining linguistic, literary, 
cultural, art and gender perspectives with biotechnological and cognitive prospects, my 
research can shed a new light to the meaning of art pr ctice.  
A similar approach has already been offered by Evelyn Fox Keller, whose point of 
departure is a duplicate of former ideas which I mentioned before: border-crossing between 
binarisms — metaphors and machines, software and har ware, saying and doing, and in 
general — science and language studies. The novelty of Fox-Keller is based on the extended 
notion of Austin’s performativity. Her assumption is that all language is performative, but not 
in speech-acts terms, rather beyond them. This statement provides her to reflect about the 
effectiveness of metaphors in science, which depends o  “shared social conventions and the 
authority conventionally granted to those who use it” (Fox-Keller 1995: XII). I think, 
however, that her analysis misses the emphasis that is placed on two different ways of 
interacting — so the effect that science has through language on society (such as common 
ideas) and vice versa changes the way that science is actually represented. When we think 
about performativity, we can fall into the trap of a one-sided, unidirectional way of linguistic 
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constructivism and see metaphors as something which create our life entirely. Fox-Keller 
raises the question about borrowing techniques from literary studies to scrutinize science, 
which encourages me to join humanist and scientific d s iplines.  
Using examples from bio-art, I will show how representationalism goes hand in hand 
with materialism. Uniting these two growing (but not linearly evolving) branches may 
contribute to ‘noncanonical hypertrophy’ — in Deleuzian language called ‘rhizome’ — of 
interlacing representations. Each of them has its tangible fountainhead, because “[…] 
language is always the language of bodies” (Deleuze 2000: 92), but not only human bodies, 
which is what bio-art works clearly represent. 
 
2.2.1. Biology as an art 
 
As Eduardo Kac has clearly pointed out, there are two stages of development of bio-art. 
The first, not the ‘proper’ one, is seen as a longing for an artistic element within the functional 
production/creation of biological entities.  
 
However, human beings have not restricted their creativity to solving practical problems. 
Artworks created by our early ancestors have been discovered in multiple locations. It is 
likely that aesthetics motivated not only the creation of objects, but also the selection of 
animal and plant characteristics. It has been suggested that early efforts to domesticate 
plants and animals were not associated with an increased demand for products for human 
consumption, but rather with the production of plants and animals for special occasions 
frequently of a religious nature. The different breeds of cats and dogs that exist today are 
living evidence that animal selection has frequently been based on aesthetic 
characteristics. (Kac (ed.) 2007: 216) 
 
Therefore the beginnings of bio-art — as a legitimized trend in art — are seen in the event of 
showing genetically altered flowers in two different exhibitions of flowers. It is worth 
underlying that never before were the animals or plants themselves the object of artistic 
invention and development (Ibid.: 11). First it was done in 1936 (sic!) in MoMa, where 
Edward Steichen showed the results of the process of developing the ultimate aesthetic 
possibilities of the delphinium (Ibid.: 347). In 1988 George Gessert’s Iris Project was 
exhibited at the New Langton Arts in San Francisco. Since the 1970’s, Gessert has been 
working on breeding plants and looking for a new kind of iris-hybrid for aesthetic purposes.  
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Marta de Menezes — the next well-known bio-artist — claims that “[…] biology is 
similar to photography, video, and computers in that it can be successfully adapted by artists 
for use as an art medium” (Ibid.: 217). At this stage biology-as-a-material is not disturbed 
later when new materials are incorporated (such as previously invisible DNA, proteins, cells), 
transformation, interconnection and multiplication become a clue of a new face and phase of 
art. 
But at this moment in time, even without inner intrusion, biology is seen as a piece of 
art, not only as a material or mode of creating, but as an actual work of art. Such a goal was 
also raised by the event titled Beauty in Science, organized in 2011 in the Boijmans Museum 
in Rotterdam10. Besides the main question: “Does aesthetics also play a part in scientific 
research?”, the project prepared by Professor Hans Galjaard shows the interchangeability of 
discourses. It seems to me that the same goal is raised by natural history museums, but 
without the surplus of theoretical context. Besides tracking strict aesthetic dimension of the 
science-art adjacency, we can also study this matter in depth and absorb its ontological 
consequences. Moreover, I think that such fruitful combination of artistic languages and 
science should bring not only a mixture of languages and convertibility of scientific and 
artistic images, but also an ontological reflection which is concerned with different status of 
subjectivity in technoreality. 
To summarize, within the historical dimension of bio-art we can then see three different 
approaches, and I would categorize them into following: 
 
1) biology as a material of artistic activity (aesthetic) 
2) biological processes as a way of creating art (functio al) 
3) biology as a way of perceiving art work (ontological) 
 
As we will see, all those three views on biology as art are combined in the new stream: ‘bio-
art’, however, I would regard the last — ontological dimension of artistic creation — as the 
most significant.  
 
 
                                                           
10 More about exhibition: http://www.boijmans.nl/en/7/kalender/calendaritem/754/schoonheid-in-de-wetenschap. 
[5.04.2011 r.]. 
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2.2.2. Art beyond biology 
 
In spite of the series of postmodernist changes that have reevaluated the notion of 
originality and artistic irresponsibility, these transformations were oscillating mainly around 
a conceptual dimension of art and free-floating ideas submerged into an intertextual grid. 
Simultaneously, since the 1990’s, the streams of ‘transgenic/genetic/bio art’ have been 
developing a new entrance into an art-science split, calling into question the borders between 
human and non-human. 
The first usage of the term showed up in 1997, when Eduardo Kac had been employing 
the phrase ‘bio-art’ in reference to his own works that involved biological agency, such as 
Time Capsule and A-positive, both presented in 1997 (Kac (ed.) 2007: 164). In 1998 the 
ART+BIO exhibition took place at Central Michigan University. The next significant events 
in the history of bio-art were taking place in 1999 within LifeScience at the Ars Electronica 
festival, and L’Art Biotech in Nantes, in 2003. The last decade abounded in a significant 
amount of events that would address bio-art-related subjects, such as Art of the Biotech Era 
(the Adelaide Bank Festival of Arts 2004), Dias de Bioarte ‘06 (CAPSULA in Barcelona), 
Still, Living (Biennale of Electronics Arts, Perth 2007), and Sk-interfaces (Foundation of Arts 
and Creative Technology, Liverpool 2008). In 2007 a new award category, dedicated to 
hybrid art, was institutionalized within Ars Electronica (see Kallergi 2008: 2; Stairs 1998: 
263). Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture was founded in 2006.11 Moreover, in 
March 2012 Animism — a project asking questions about the borders between objects and 
subjects, between nature and culture, between the psyche and the material world — has been 
started in Berlin.12 A work titled Agency (1992; special selection for Animism, Berlin 2012) 
poses the particular question: can non-human protagonists — animals, objects — be creative, 
and thereby engages non-human as subjects on the artistic stage? 
As Adam Zaretsky pointed out: “Bio-art is a way of l oking where we interface with 
ourselves, human culture and the rest of the living world” (Pasko; Kac (ed.) 2007). Of course, 
there is no clear and uniform definition of the bioart. One of the common features of various 
bio-projects is their thematic connection with a phenomenon of life formulated in the context 
of biology and biotechnology. Kac offers the most comprehensive categorization of bio-art 
diversity: 
                                                           
11 Access online: http://www.antennae.org.uk/. [1.04.2 12]. 
12 More information: http://www.hkw.de/en/programm/2012/animismus/animismus_68723.php. [1.04.2012]. 
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Bio art is a new direction in contemporary art that manipulates the processes of life. 
Invariably, bio art employs one or more of the following approaches: (1) the coaching of 
biomaterials into specific inert shapes or behaviors; (2) the unusual or subversive use of 
biotech tools and processes; (3) the invention or transformation of living organisms with 
or without social or environmental integration. (Kac 2007: 18) 
 
 
One of the most important features of ‘bio-turn’ in contemporary art is the change from 
seeing the new biological entities as a class of objects, and instead as new subjects: “The 
difference between biological agency and biological objecthood is that the first involves an 
active principle while the second implies material se f-containment” (Kac (ed.) 2007: 164). 
From the one-dimensional space that represents without intervening in the used material 
medium (paintings, virtual media, graphics, etc.), the artistic practices have been going 
toward complicated art manipulating life mechanisms, such as transgenesis, bio-robotics, 
synthesis of artificial DNA, biotechnological and medical autoexperiments, etc. Because of 
the limited space of my work, I can only mention the ethical controversies concerned with 
these kinds of artistic processes of production, which raise discussion about this trend.13 
 
2.3. Bio-art as uncovering and discovering 
 
Hélène Cixous in the short story wherefrom the motto f my work is taken describes 
a tale about a myopic woman, who “had been living i the cave of the species, docile to 
fatality” (Cixous 2001: 8). One day she received a surgery and from that day forward she saw 
the world clearly. She began nostalgic reminiscing about the life ‘before’, delineated as ‘not-
seeing-oneself’. This very metaphorical story raises the riddle of the process of acquiring self-
consciousness, while showing the irreversibility of the course of our culture. Another 
metaphorical, short but cunning, sentence —a “body is an Egypt” (Deleuze 2000: 93)— 
shows perpetual desire to look inside, under the cov r, under the skin: 
 
Science has developed powerful tools to image the interior of the body. Since Roentgen’s 
discovery of X-rays, we have begun to be able to see what is hidden behind the skin. 
                                                           
13 GFP Bunny by Eduardo Kac stands as an example of controversies concerned with law regulations of 
transgenic animals. The project was completed in February 2000 with the birth of Alba in Jouy-en-Josas, France. 
The author wanted to take Alba home (Chicago) and incorporate her into his family. It appeared as an impossible 
challenge because of legislative differences which have emerged between Europe and US. See more about 
governing Laws in the United States and the EU and moral implications of transformation of living being in 
Perzigian (2003). 
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Today, new imaging technology allows better visualization of both biological 
morphology and function. (de Menezes; Kac (ed.) 2007: 223) 
 
Feminist art historians mention two stadia within hstory of art, I would add the third 
one, now only briefly and generally describing phases, not relating to any specific genre (as 
I am going to explain in the next chapter): 
 
1) man looking at woman 
2) woman looking at woman 
3) woman/man looking inside a body 
 
Voyeurism has been widely criticized mainly by feminist film theory and overcome by 
feminist artists who instead, developed alternative ways of portraying women (e.g. Mulvey 
1989, Portuges 1996, Smelik 1999, et. al). The new, third level would be called an ‘inner 
voyeurism’, which scopes out DNA, proteins, cells, and organisms, transgressing former 
stable borders which regulate the social order. 
Those powerful tools have altered the binarisms suggested by previous formulations and 
found the third way, being a mediation between representation and life itself. Not enough, 
because “[t]he process of redefinition uncovers an unknown and dangerous terrain where each 
of these productions becomes a vertiginous and terrifying sign” (Bec; Kac (ed.) 2007: 84). 










3. REPRESENTATION, FIGURATION, TRANSFIGURATION. A C ONTRIBUTION 




The task of bringing into adequate representation the sort of new mixtures that contemporary 
subjects have become is at the heart of poststructuralist philosophies […]. 




3.1. Upheaval of representation 
 
“Modes of ‘representation’, ‘expression’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘modeling’ are literally 
exploding. They are symptoms of the fundamental upheaval that shakes the normative models 
of contemporary societies” (Bec; Kac (ed.) 2007: 84). The notion of representation no longer 
seems to be an innocent concept which has no influence on reality and, at the same time, does 
not come under anyone’s influence. Representation becomes a core-issue for contemporary 
philosophy and critical theory (or, rather, philosophies and theories), dealing with new 
political arrays, new power-relations filtered and reformulated by technology, finally — 
dealing with new subjects has emerged, voiced-up in co nection to the processes of 
decolonization, settlements after the most dramatic Endlösungs, emancipation, technological 
transgressions, etc.  
The postmodern era is often seen as an anti-representational passage because of the 
rejection of the universal and superior moral/political/religious instance. While feminism(s) 
showed that the representational thought is highly masculine (Irigaray 1985, Cixous 1975), 
postfeminism clarified that the feminist representation is unfairly standardized, and 
postcolonialism revealed that the subaltern cannot speak on behalf of him/herself (Spivak 
1988). Recapitulating the traditional, normative, classical way of representing is inappropriate 
nowadays when we have a stake in a vision of a non-u itary subject, in Deleuzian words “a 
rhizomatic subject-in-becoming” (Braidotti 2006: 14), being a complex intersection of 
subjective embodiments (“new forms of micro-, infra- and counter-subjectivities”; Ibid.: 44), 
located in certain time and space. 
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A bit caricatural a once-over of the twentieth-century theory of subjectivity shows the 
gradual disintegration of that monolithic category. The psychoanalytical revolution of 
Sigmund Freud has become a flywheel of metamorphoses f subjectivity. It has broken the 
Cartesian battlefield, scraped distinctly in a few words: “Since now I am pretending that 
I don’t have a body, these are mere fictions” (Descartes 1993 [1647]: 5), and pulled 
reflections out from the somatophobic dimension. Then the time for a linguistic turn has come 
and the Lacanian paradigm has made the binding way of ‘reading’ subjectivity. Derrida 
comes to the Lacanian aid: the next direction within the poststructuralist abyss is the 
deconstructionist following différance as a masterpiece of aporetic landscapes. Michel 
Foucault brings in the perspective of historical analysis of power. Gilles Deleuze goes a step 
further and stops on the ground of radical empiricism. Subjectivity is no longer a frivolous 
play of signifiers. It is grounded, rooted in monistic ontology, whereas the subject is seen in 
non-anthropocentric categories. Deleuze re-thinks “subjectivity as an intensive, multiple and 
discontinuous process of interrelations” and sees “thi  ‘somatic’ dimension […] in vitalistic 
terms” (Braidotti 2002: 69, 72). Maurice Blanchot calls into question the possibility of 
creating a community where members’ identities are not simply in the process of merging 
with a collective ego (Blanchot 1988). Afterwards, it is even said that 
individuality/subjectivity is replaced by ‘trans-individuality’ (Guattari & Simondon’s term; 
qtd. in Braidotti 2006: 41) and I will expand on tha  at the end of this chapter. 
Therefore, the very challenge is to find such modes of representation that are adequate 
for the complexities of the real-life world (pace Braidotti 2006), regarding the traditional 
notion of representation (and other synonymic categori s such as a portrait, self-portrait, 
mask, an imago, icon, etc.) was rejected14 — as a linguistic tool which cannot represent the 
reality and/or subjectivity — within the new critical wing of feminism (I mean mostly early 
Judith Butler’s theory associated with linguistic paradigm15 and the subsequent material 
turn,16 deriving inspirations from Deleuzian philosophy). Those reflections, repeatedly 
coming back on the theoretical ground of (postmodern) theory of culture and memory studies 
are my starting point to rethink the notion of representation one more time. In spite of the fact 
                                                           
14 Rosi Braidotti’s thought encouraged me to state this inadequacy so flatly: “Representational thinking and the 
linguistic turn are outdated models to account for the kind of subjects we have already become” (2006: 4 ). 
15 The linguistic paradigm is understood here as an over-emphasis on textuality, representation, interpretation 
and the power of the signifier (pace Braidotti 2006: 50), rejecting bodily reactions (and even presence) of author 
and receiver as well. 
16 The material turn (also known as new materialism) can be seen as a new intellectual formation, which goes 
beyond geopolitical formations, spreading between different academic communities. To put it bluntly and 
shortly: it restores the materiality of subjects to philosophical reflections. 
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that the representation has lost its firepower after superannuation of the linguistic turn, the 
category itself is no longer vital for the mimetic paradigm. But even then, after the series of 
perturbations, we cannot get rid of this term. Representation, rather, has stopped meaning 
a free chain of signifiers, whereas each one refers to one another and there is no referent 
outside the language. Neither can we run away from the body nor can we pass over the 
morphology (biological and linguistic as well). We have to take up the gauntlet of situating 
this symbolic structure in a new order. After years of feminist literary criticism rooted in 
academia, we do not have to draw visions of utopian atmosphere. In/ability of representation 
is concerned with changeable, fluid ontological status of the subject (no more Subject). The 
difference between presented realms can be seen as a p sage from a discursive realm to 
a stricte material one; from omnipotence of the symbolic system to the proliferation of 
discourses, and finally, to the multiplicity of beings. 
Molly Andrews has already used the category of a ‘new representation’: 
 
What might this new representation look like? And might new forms of narrative be 
a useful tool in this most challenging pursuit? These are questions which scholars of 
trauma testimony have been grappling with, and to which there are no definitive answers. 
(2010: 160) 
 
I would like to try to respond to her questions (even though it is not exactly in the direction of 
trauma testimony), by taking the new techno-cultures into account and being guided by 
feminist critical theory. I believe that feminist criticism can be seen as a re-novation in the 
light of transformations of humanist studies. After the series of criticisms directed at blurring, 
spreading out notions of feminist collective,17 after a significant popularity of hybridities, 
which have become empty words, we can rethink the content of our metaphors and add new 
semantic fields. 
The goal of my project is to re-think, re-read, re-interpret the concept of representation. 
My primary aim is to scrutinize the shift from ‘subject-object’ positioning to ‘subject-subject’ 
relation. The latter is present in the process of (self-)portraying, particularly in the domain of 
bio-art, the inevitable focal point of which is alwys a reflection on the changing role of art in 
thinking about the importance of science and technology in gender relations. Hence we will 
see how the instability, in other words — the permanent becoming of a subject — gains new 
figuration on the artistic ground. I hope to connect the traditional tools from literary and 
                                                           
17 This is the next big and problematic notion, but somehow solved within the intersectional approach, 
embracing and taking into account all the differences between subjects and their equal features. 
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linguistic background with the broad cognitive scien  achievements as new methodological 
ability to explore bio-art works. 
First, I would like to examine the etymology of the notion of representation, using tools 
of comparative linguistic studies. Following the Deleuzian notion of a “violent effect of 
a sign” (Deleuze 2000: 23), I will compare etymology (originated from different languages) 
of notions related to referents included within thecategory of representation: a (self-) portrait, 
an image, a mask, etc. Secondly, working on differences and similarities between categories 
of representation and figuration, I will compare various definitions and conceptions of 
representation (among others: Hall 2010, Spivak 1988, Butler 1990, Sobchack 2004) and 
figuration (Braidotti 2002, 2006; Haraway 1991) functioning within feminist theory. 
I have prepared a ‘minicartography’ of concepts that will show that the representational 
status quo is insufficient to analyze bio-art works. In the end, I will make an attempt at 
preparing new tools facilitating the reception of a new class of portraits. 
 
3.2. Etymology of the notion of representation 
 
The history of the portrait — as an artistic form, as well as a social practice — goes 
back to the 3rd millennium B.C. when portraits of Tii, Nefretete and her daughters were 
created. The connection between a ritual of mourning and preparing epitaphial images is well-
known in theory and practice of portraying.18 Before the word ‘masque’ became operative, 
a ‘larva’ had been an Etruscan designation for a shamanic mask,19 from which the portrait has 
evolved. Gilles Deleuze also refers to ‘larval subjects’, elaborating on his concept of 
becoming-subject: 
We do not begin as subjects who then have to know a world; there is experience and from 
this experience we form an image of ourselves as distinct subjects. Before ‘the’ subject of 
mind, then, there are what Deleuze refers to as ‘larva  subjects’: a multiplicity of 
perceptions and contemplations not yet organised into a self. (Colebrook 2002: 74) 
 
The ‘larval entity’ marks then the not-ready, unstable subject who performs him/herself in the 
never-ending story built throughout his/her life. Now, as we will see, the portrait (or self-
                                                           
18 For instance, in the works of Władimir Toporow (2004), Vladimir Jankélévitch (2005), Hans Belting (2007), 
Rosi Braidotti (1994), et al. 
19 Latin larvāre means practise magic. See: Bańkowski (2000: 5). 
22 
portrait) neither gives the solid, invariable image of a person, nor aspires to the ‘truth’, 
although it is supported by scientific authority.  
First of all, the portrait as a genre in the new artistic version goes back to the indicated 
etymological relation. ‘Larval roots’ become incorpated in art as strategies of 
performativity, which show the relational basis of being the “I”. As Amelia Jones writes, 
analyzing the photographical self-portraits: 
 
Exaggerating their own performances of themselves, [...] artists, then, explore the 
capacity of the self-portrait photograph to foreground the “I” as other to itself, the artistic 
subject as “taking place” in the future through interpretive acts that bring her or him back 
to life via memory and desire (the “I,” I am arguing, is always other to itself; these 
practices merely foreground this structure of subjectification). (2008: 950) 
 
Secondly, the noun ‘image’ in Polish is ‘obraz’. The word includes the part ‘-raz’, 
which means ‘a blow’ and connotes associations withviolence (see Bańkowski 2000: 349), 
already pointed out by Deleuze. We find ourselves in a similar situation, analyzing the 
etymology of the word ‘to portray’, which leads us to the meaning of the term ‘trace’.20 
A trace not only directs us to the semantic field connected with the process of drawing, but 
also hides the second connotation — concerned with captivity: it designates a cord used to 
truss people and animals. Latin term ‘portrahere’ (‘-trahere’ shaped into ‘trace’) primarily 
means invoking, coming out, spreading, extending, which makes a mechanism of coercion, 
the connection between image and death being very distinct. To quote Jones again: “the 
subject performs herself or himself within the purview of an apparatus of perspectival looking 
that freezes the body as representation and so — as absence, as always already d d — in 
intimate relation to lack and loss” (2008: 949).  
What is ultimately at stake in that, as we will seein the next chapter, is the insufficiency 
of definitions of representation which are still being understood in the mimetic vein. The 
etymological track, showing a violent practice hidden in representational strains, leads our 
reflection further. The newly released subject, always performing him/herself, cannot be 
frozen in a shape of representation of his/her temporary body, simply because the body is 
permanently changeable. Even though we will always create representations (usable or 
artistic, figural or conceptual, realistic or abstract, etc.), our terminological apparatus is 
                                                           
20 Online Etymology Dictionary. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=portray. [2.02.2010]. 
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outdated. That is why I would like to suggest a contribution of metamorphoses of this 
nomenclature, giving, if possible, ample space to illustrate the new theoretical tools. 
 
3.3. A contribution to the cartography of representations 
 
At this point in time we need a new look at past mehodologies and we have to “show 
that contemporary feminist epistemology has moved away from producing classifications and 
towards cartographical approaches” (van der Tuin, 2009: 18). Earlier the mtaphor of 
cartography, implicite, was used by Irigaray (1985), Cixous (in Cixous’ case it is the strategy 
of describing a bodily territory of women; 1975), and, explicite, by Butler (1990), Braidotti 
(1994, 2002, 2006) in order to emphasize the complexity of the feminine experience and the 
performative approach to subjectivity. As Braidotti categorically notes: “The process of 
drawing cartographies of the present is central to the social theory and cultural studies, in both 
feminist and mainstream theories” (Braidotti 2006: 78). 
My trial to rank the most important definitions and conceptualizations of representations 
will be formed as a contour map, prepared to fulfill and provide with details. But for now, 
‘rough isolines’ will stand as scaffolding for my project. I will now present the critical 
evolution of the concept, trying to underline the most important changes. Stuart Hall — 
probably the biggest theorist of representation — sees representation as a process which links 
together several elements: meanings given to the world by constructing a set of 
correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things; constructions of sets of 
correspondences between conceptual map and webs of signs, arranged into various languages 
(Hall 2010; Hall (ed.): 19). Furthermore, he dispens s three approaches to representation 
(ibid.): 
 
1) reflective/mimetic — where the meaning is thought to lie in the 
object/person/idea/event; 
2) intentional — where the speaker/author imposes a unique meaning on the world 
through language; 
3) constructionist — the meaning is constructed through concepts and signs, neither 
lies in reality nor in language. 
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This categorization misses, generally speaking, the political dimension of representation and 
is focused on the process of generating images, thu the reception is passed over. One of the 
most important ascertainments was made by Gayatri Spivak (1988: 70), who highlights 
“[t]wo ways of representation are being run together: r presentation as ‘speaking for’, as in 
politics, and re-presentation, as in art and philosophy” within the theory of the subject. Butler 
(1990) adds that representation is a normative functio  of language, which shows or deforms 
“presumed truth about category of women”. Moreover, she postulates ousting conception of 
representation and replacing it by the term of ‘open coalition’, which should stand as an 
affirmation of identities, the infinite puzzle without necessity to follow toward normative 
telos — that is — a closing definition. At the same time, however, she claims that the politics 
of representation is not about judging between good an  bad or authentic and imposed 
representations. Rather, it works through the paradoxical mechanisms repeating norms, 
whereas each repetition is already a change within the represented self (see Colebrook 2009). 
Haraway goes even further with the criticism of traditional representation, implicite referring 
to etymology of that concept, and claiming that “[…] representation depends on possession of 
a passive resource, namely, the silent object, the stripped actant” (1991: 89). In the same vein, 
Rosi Braidotti reminds us that: 
 
[…] in Western philosophy, the masculine as term of reference of the dominant view of 
subjectivity21 coincides with the exercise of basic symbolic functions, such as reason, 
self-regulation, self-representation, transcendence and its corollary; the power to name 
and appoint positions of ‘otherness’ as a set of constitutive outsiders who design by 
negation the parameters of subjectivity. Deleuze argues that the masculine coincides with 
the fixity of the centre, which in western philosophy is represented through the notion of 
Being. (2008: 307) 
 
Moreover, David Richard turns his critique into a postcolonial tone: “[t]he 
representation of other cultures invariably entails the presentations of self-portraits, in that 
those people who are observed are overshadowed or eclipsed by the observer” (1994: 298), 
again emphasizing the hierarchy between subjects engaged in the process of representing, 
which empowers the observer/the portraying person to impose his/her subjective point of 
view. 
As we can see, the notion of representation is being h ghly deconstructed as a medium 
infected by the hierarchical structure of the subject–object relation: portraying–portrayed 
person or model–voyeur asymmetry. One of the most influential criticisms of asymmetric 
                                                           
21 The postulate of creating one’s own imagery and imagination was broadly discussed by the French wing of 
feminist philosophy (Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous), but there is no place to describe all the theoretical options.  
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gazes in narrative cinema was proposed by Laura Mulvey. Drawing on the psychoanalytical 
theory of the subject, particularly on taking pleasure in looking, Mulvey criticizes the 
scopophilic mechanism of desire, functioning on the axis of activity and passivity, whereas 
woman is identified with object-position and, therefo , passivity (Mulvey 1989).  
One step further, Steven Shaviro claims that the relation between two levels (the level 
of body and the level of representation) is non-hierarchical and there is no mimetic effect of 
the image. On the contrary, the relationship is ‘reve sible’, simply meaning that the 
representation causes receiving results: 
 
[…] the body and representation (cinematic representation, linguistic representation, et. 
al.) do not simply — or only — oppose or reflect each other. Rather, they more radically 
in-form each other in a fundamentally non-hierarchical and reversible relationship of 
commensurability and incommensurability that, in certain circumstances, manifests itself 
as an oscillating, ambivalent, and often ambiguous or ‘undecidable’ experience. (Shaviro; 
Sobchack 2004: 61) 
 
Finally, going through Butler’s path of performativi y, Lilie Chouliaraki clearly underlines the 
performative capacity of representation, which enables us “not only to re-present the world to 
its audiences but also to propose to them how to think and feel about the world” (2008: 838). 
This superficial review of differently stretched criti isms of the notion of representation 
shows, on the one hand, that the concept has to be adjusted to new conditions again, but on 
the other hand indicates the “multiple economy of representation” (Ibid.: 847), which could 
be developed within a refined system of depiction. The question is: which form of 
representation enables subjects to include the permanent change within the figure of self-
representation? Various feminist texts mention four figures, which have already become 
formal topoi of representation. Three of them are the traditional figures of speech (metonymy, 
metaphor and catachresis); two of those three come from Lacanian theory (metonymy and 
metaphor). 
 
1) Metonymy — in literary studies — is a figure of speech that uses one object in place 
of another related concept.22 In Lacanian theory unconsciousness is treated as 
a linguistic mechanism, contrary to the traditional Freudian thought, where language 
(or its lack, for instance, in the case of aphasia) becomes only a symptom of bodily 
                                                           
22 Babylon — Literary Terms Dictionary. http://www.baylon.com/define/58/literary-terms-dictionary.html 
[2.05.2012]. 
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reactions (see the famous Dora’s diagnosis). In The Agency of the Letter in the 
Unconscious, or Reason since Freud Lacan, analyzing the two operations of the 
unconscious displacement and condensation, identifis d splacement with metonymy 
or the syntagmatic pole of language (Rabine 1987-1988: 35). Following Roman 
Jakobson, Lacan links metonymy to the combinatorial axis of language, as opposed to 
the substitutive axis (reserved for metaphor), and defines metonymy as 
the diachronic relation between one signifier and another in the signifying chain. 
Meanwhile, Peggy Phelan interprets those ranks differently and sees the realm of 
metonymy as a stricte bodily way of representing (on the contrary to theLacanian 
linguistic definition of the term): “[i]n moving from the grammar of words to the 
grammar of the body, one moves from the realm of metaphor to the realm of 
metonymy” (1993: 150). But even in this interpretation, the metonymical mechanism 
is restricted to the pure body art, where the body produces meanings, stands as 
something else. 
 
2) Metaphor — in rhetoric it is described as “[…] emerging from a hierarchical relation 
between a primary and secondary context of language use. That is, a word is 
understood as literal insofar as it is used in a normative (hence ‘naturalizing’) context 
and becomes understood as figural or metaphoric only when it is used in an unusually 
extended sense and transferred beyond its normal context (indeed, the word 
‘metaphor’ means ‘carried beyond’)” (Sobchack 2004: 80). Within the 
psychoanalytical discourse the condensation and the metaphor are the same process. 
According to Lacan, there are two kinds of metaphor: metaphor as condensation, 
which, while erupting as a symptom of the unconscious, “disrupts the unity of that 
symbolic order and the Oneness of the subject based on it”, and metaphor as 
substitution, “identified with the psychoanalytical figure of the father” (Rabine 1987-
1988: 35-36). The second term uncovers the masculine regime of unconsciousness 
within Lacanian theory, which as mentioned before, Luce Irigaray was fighting 
against. But the first one, again, identifies metaphor with the substitutive axis 
of language, and shows the aporetic basis of represntation, the split between subject 
and representation, where one replaces another, hence they can never be united.  
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3) Catachresis — as a rhetorical sign becomes a misuse of words; stretching a metaphor, 
or using a word inaccurately in a metaphorical way.23 Vivian Sobchack offers this 
term as the most suitable, and joining the representatio al with material dimension: 
“What kind of representation or linguistic construction conflates the literal and figural 
[…]? The answer is not metaphor, but catachresis, sometimes called false and 
improper metaphor. Catachresis mediates and conflates the metaphoric and the literal 
and is used when no proper, or literal, term is avail ble” (Sobchack 2004: 81). 
Unfortunately, catachresis operates ably in the literary realm, but cannot cope with all 
the different kinds of new art practice. 
 
4) Figuration — as a term related to art theory it means  shape; molded form; figurative 
performance; figurative decoration.24 Therefore, according to Braidotti — figuration is 
the most suitable figure for the new mode of representing subjects, because — 
described within cartographical mood — it “stands for transformative account of the 





The notion of figuration is the broadest from all those presented terms. Traditionally 
contrasted with abstract and conceptual, the figurative art showed silhouettes, presenting 
congealed entities. The new re-reading of the figurative way of depicting subjects also 
encompasses their commotion, understood as a great amount and variety of the positions of 
self and, more importantly, different intersections, connections and combinations of them. 
The proliferation of subjects and their multiple belongings25 cannot be expressed only by 
means of traditional rhetorical figures, which I have already shown above. Metamorphoses of 
subjectivity in contemporary socio-political showed that we need more flexible tools of 
representing ourselves, divested of the “violent effect of a sign”. As Braidotti explains: 
 
                                                           
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 This term comes from Aiwa Ong’s work on Chinese migrants and is widely used by Rosi Braidotti in her 
works (2002, 2006). 
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Figurations are not figurative ways of thinking, but rather more materialistic mapping of 
situated or embedded and embodied, positions. A cartogr phy is a theoretically-based and 
politically-informed reading of the present. A cartographic approach fulfils the function 
of providing both exegetical tools and creative theoretical alternatives. As such it 
responds to my two main requirements, namely to account for one’s location in terms 
both of space (geo-political or ecological dimensio) and time (historical and 
genealogical dimension), and to provide alternative figurations or schemes of 
representations for these locations, in terms of power as restrictive (potestas) but also 
empowering or affirmative (potential). I consider this cartographic gesture as the first
move towards an account of nomadic subjectivity as ethically accountable and politically 
empowering. (2002: 2) 
 
Going down the nomadic road, Braidotti presents the vision of this theoretical alternative, far 
away from the structuralist attachment to the form, as well as from the poststructuralist 
practice of ‘interpretative drifting’. The nomadic strategy requires the knowledge about inner 
characteristics, but, even so, about external conditi s. This is why the figuration is no longer 
only a rhetorical figure. It is also just as firmly rooted in the philosophy of becoming, which 
stands as a way of reclaiming and relocating the process of acquiring subjectivity. The whole 
story begins with the Deleuzian reinvention of philosophical thought and then looking for 
new images which could become more than metaphors that are well-known from the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment period: 
 
The non-Oedipal woman is for Deleuze the prototype of the nomadic vision of 
subjectivity which marks his entire philosophy. Deleuze invents a unique philosophical 
style to convey this alternative view of subjectivity, which I read in terms of 
‘ f igurat ions’ for alternative subjectivities. Firmly convinced that: c’est l’image de la 
pens´ee qui guide la creation des concepts, Deleuze tracks down with rigour and 
originality the pre-philosophical passions or intensities which underlay philosophical 
concepts. […] Deleuze argues that philosophy is the extramural activity which consists in 
the creation of new concepts and new images of thought. This project of re-imaging the 
activity of thinking likes at the heart of the stylistics invented by Deleuze. All of 
Deleuze’s figurations — be it the rhizome, the body without organs, the nomad or the 
becoming — alternate a creative multiplicity with a singularity that is nonetheless 
deprived of stable roots and fixed foundations. (Braidotti 1996a: 308-309; emphasis 
mine) 
 
Moving the philosophical activity outside the cathedral, Deleuze opens a whole new space 
which can be developed by an individual or even by an intimate analysis of the self in transit 
between all the significant, geo-socio-political, dimensions of life. Every-body, based on 
these interconnections, becomes a figuration, an inner inscription containing dynamic stories: 
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Figurations are not mere metaphors, but rather markers of more concretely situated 
historical positions. A figuration is the expression f one’s specific positioning in both 
space and time. It marks certain territorial or geopolitical coordinates, but it also points 
out one’s sense of genealogy or historical inscription. Figurations deterritotialize and 
destabilize the certainties of the subject and allow for a proliferation of situated or ‘micro’ 
narratives of self and others. (Braidotti 2006: 90)
 
In general, the same idea is shared by Donna Haraway, ho sees figures (instead of 
figurations) as an interconnection between biology and art: 
 
Figures are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material–semiotic 
nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another. For me, 
figures have always been where the biological and literary or artistic come together with 
all of the force of lived reality. My body itself is just such a figure, literally. (2008: 4) 
 
This complex methodological frame will lead my analysis of particular bio-art works. The 
representations of various bodies are then considered as living organisms and art figures, 
material and metaphorical images, because “[w]e are all matter, and we all matter” (Birke, 




I have already mentioned the notion of ‘trans-individuality’ (Guattari & Simondon’s 
term; qtd. in Braidotti 2006: 41), which has replaced single individuality/subjectivity. The 
movement of transhumanism in its declaration establi hed a vision of transhumanist subject, 
stating that: “Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the 
feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the inevitability 
of aging, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen psychology, suffering, and 
our confinement to the planet earth” (WTA 2005). 
The prefix ‘trans-’ also precedes the analyzed above notion of figuration. What does it 
change? Again, it demarcates a new state of art (on he contrary to the current s atus quo): 
mobile, non-monolithic, non-hierarchical, hybrid, cartographic, anti-normative, etc. The 
hegemony of traditionally understood aesthetics is replaced by the critical role of art:  
 
[…] the new biological self-inflation is not a private resistance to reality but a generalized 
recrafting of it. Currently, we have the transfigurat ional dress of flesh: Think of 
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Orlan, whose self-sorcery consists in tirelessly sculpting mutations of herself and then 
redoubling them over the Internet. And we have the apotheosis of the decorative detail: 
Think of Eduardo Kac’s augmented or transgenic bunny Alba—altered with a single 
fluorescent green protein (GFP). In either case ident ty is jostled, but not at the visceral 
level. Kac’s skin-dressing art obliges us to recast Derrida’s ‘logic of the supplement’—
defined as the operation by which an element that a given system tries to exclude is 
readmitted to that system, but only in a negated or ebased form. (Stafford; Kac (ed.) 
2007: 377-378; emphasis mine) 
 
Therefore, we can trace the series of metamorphoses f the general notion of 
representation, presented here in different alterations. The meager cartography of changes 
presented here includes numerous operations taking place on different levels. The process of 
merging, fusing, in different words: the mechanism of hyperplasia or symbiotic growth 
abrogates the binary oppositions, organizing, so far, the art practice, transforming them into 










9) visual (voyerism, scopophilia)-differently sensorial 
 
This is the new ‘bio-logic’, as Louis Bec named it, whereat the living self “imposes itself as 
a material subject that deals with itself, even beyond representation and current artistic and 
scientific categories” (Bec; Kac (ed.) 2007: 83). That is why the methods of analysis should 
be as moveable and transversal, transposeable, etc., as entities described by them. Thus, 
we get new heterogeneous methods and hybrid achievements, joining art, life and science. 
I would call the new class of alternative artistic modes by the name ‘art-entities’ (instead of 
art works, compositions, art productions). In my next chapter I will examine examples of bio-








Art is a veritable transmutation of substance. 




The titled neologism of bio-cartography defines a new dimension of art criticism. It 
joins two semantic fields: the realm of representation and biology. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Donna Haraway states that “diverse bodies and meanings coshape one 
another” (2008: 4), formulating a material-semiotic mode of art practice, which has been 
already widely introduced in chapter 3. Artists have been trying “not only to portray the 
recent advances of biological sciences, but to incorporate biological material as new art 
media: DNA, proteins, cells, and organisms offer an opportunity to explore novel methods of 
representation and communication” (de Menezes; Kac (ed.) 2007: 218). In this regard, the 
presented chain of metamorphoses of representation offers a new perspective which reasserts 
the old methodological tools and enables them to work actively now. 
The core of my case-studies will show five works — differently playing on the border 
of art and biology, representation and life itself. There is a common feature joining the works 
together: all of them stand as portraits (some even m et requirements of self-portraits). I have 
chosen them to show the range and variety of bio-art and create a kind of comparative 
anatomy of subjects and new entities. A new avenue of expression is variously attained within 
particular artistic frames. Nevertheless, as I have underlined in the second chapter, there is 
a very strong link between all those artistic insights: they embody the aesthetic paradox of 
exposing, uncovering what is hidden, invisible. They adopt the mechanism of probing, 
exploring the area so far standing as terra incognita for artists and when they display the final 
results of their work, even against the law, there is a bourgeois morality or shock-effect 
provoked on the audience. This way, the bio-art becomes a manifestation of new ethics; “[i]f 
the point of ethics is to explore how much a body can do, in the pursuit of active modes of 
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empowerment through experimentation, how do we know when we have gone too far?” 
(Braidotti 2006: 158). 
The bio-art works function not only as test-machines, but also as public demonstration 
of scientific possibilities and simultaneously provide a critical dossier of laboratory 
experiments. Therefore, they bind the scientific to the artistic, the cognitive to the emotional, 
the human to the non-human, unfolding the whole newdimension of bio-techno-others. The 
paradigm of biotechnoteratology has somewhat ended, since hybrid critters have inhabited 
many domains of our everyday lives. The genre of (self-)portrait, unavoidable version of 
which is the bio-portrait, proves that we are much closer to biotechnoteratogens than 
we suspect. 
In this chapter I will confront the previously prepared evolution of the theoretical 
apparatus with the newest bio-art realizations. Firstly, I will introduce the artists, whose works 
are the subjects of my analysis. I will vaguely locate them within the bio-art map, showing 
their main interests. Secondly, I will examine their works, exposing different strategies of bio-
portrayal. Finally, I will formulate some critical remarks towards non-human representation 
included within the part of the analyzed works. 
 
4.1. Artists’ profiles. Short introduction 
 
I have chosen five different names and works. Some f the artists are internationally 
recognized; some also became theoreticians of the new artistic trend. The offered 
juxtaposition becomes a non-linear, but not chaotic pattern, which aspires to be 
a minicartography of contemporary bio-art practice. A contribution to the cartography of 
transfigurations, it can never be complete and finished, fulfilled and irreversibly systematized. 
The selective introduction to the artistic achievements will provide a basic recognition of the 





4.1.1. Eduardo Kac 
 
Eduardo Kac is internationally recognized for his telepresence and bio-art. A pioneer of 
telecommunications art in the pre-Web-80’s, Kac emerged in the early 1990’s with his radical 
works combining telerobotics and living organisms. His visionary integration of robotics, 
biology and networking explores the fluidity of subject positions in the post-digital world. His 
work deals with issues that range from the mythopoetics of online experience (Uirapuru) to 
the cultural impact of biotechnology (Genesis); from the changing condition of memory in the 
digital age (Time Capsule) to the distributed collective agency (Teleporting an Unknown 
State); from the problematic notion of the ‘exotic’ (Rara Avis) to the creation of life and 
evolution (GFP Bunny). One of the most spectacular works of Kac is named Edunia and it is 
the central work of the Natural History of the Enigma. Edunia is a genetically-engineered 




Stelarc (it has been his legal name since 1972) is a performance artist who has visually 
probed and acoustically amplified his body. He has made three films of his body’s inside. 
Between 1976-1988 he completed 25 body suspension performances with hooks into the skin. 
He has used medical instruments, prosthetics, robotics, Virtual Reality systems, the Internet 
and biotechnology to explore alternate, intimate and involuntary interfaces with the body. He 
has performed with a Third Hand, a Virtual Arm, a Stomach Sculpture and Exoskeleton, a 6-
legged walking robot. His Fractal Flesh, Ping Body, and Parasite performances explored 
involuntary, remote and internet choreography of the body with electrical stimulation of the 
muscles. His Prosthetic Head is an embodied conversational agent that speaks to the person 
who interrogates it. He has been surgically constructing an Extra Ear on his arm that will be 
internet enabled, making it a publicly accessible acoustical organ for people in other places. 
He is presently performing as his avatar from his Second Life site. I will be working on the 
                                                           
26 Information about the artist from: http://www.ekac.org/kacbio600.html. [30.04.2012]. 
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‘extension’ of the project Extra Ear, called Ear on Arm — the surgical construction of a full-
sized ear on artist’s forearm, one that would transmit the sounds it hears.27  
 
4.1.3. Marta de Menezes 
 
Marta de Menezes is a Portuguese artist born in Lisbon, working mostly on the 
connection between art and science, particularly art and biology. She was creating her works 
in research laboratories, demonstrating how new technologies can be used as art medium and 
proving that a laboratory can be an art studio (currently with a project called Ectopia). De 
Menezes is one of the first and well-known representatives of the trend called bio-art, having 
published her theoretical manifesto in the book edited by Eduardo Kac. Among her art 
projects we find: Proteic Portraits, Inner Cloud, Nuclear Family, and Extended Family, 
which take advantage of different DNA functions. Her work Nature? is a collection of live 
butterflies with wing patterns never before seen in nature; Extended Family shows the 
similarities between human and other species genes. I will focus on two works from the series 
Functional Portraits made in the years 2002-2003, which were created during a collaboration 
with Patricia Figueiredo, a physicist at the University of Oxford.28 
 
4.1.4. Frederik De Wilde  
 
Frederik de Wilde is a Belgian artist, acting on the border area between science, 
technology and art. The conceptual crux of his artistic praxis is related to the notions of the 
intangible, inaudible, invisible. It is this interstitial territory that De Wilde explores in his 
various works; among others: EODO2, Qu[Art]z, UMWelt:VIRUtopia, Vectors 4 
[UN]Certainty or On Fire. Sometimes on the side of the technological, and often in the 
perceptual, conceptual, social-human register, De Wilde’s art is grounded in the interaction 
between complex systems, both biological and technological. Moreover, the indistinct, 
diffuse, ‘fuzzy’ arena where the biological and the technological overlap and comingle is 
                                                           
27 Biographic entry gathered from: http://stelarc.org/testForFlash.html. [4.05.2012]. 
28 More on the artist’s website: http://www.martademenezes.com/. [15.03.2012]. 
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a productive and favored ground for his projects/projections. I will focus on the series of 
works called Nano-Art. “It features nanolandscapes (molecular and atomic landscapes which 
are natural structures of matter at molecular and atomic scales) and nanosculptures (structures 
created by scientists and artists by manipulating matter at molecular and atomic scales using 
chemical and physical processes). These structures are visualized with powerful research tools 
like scanning electron microscopes and atomic force microscopes and their scientific images 
are captured and further processed by using different artistic techniques to convert them into 
artworks showcased for audiences”.29 
 
4.1.5. Marc Quinn 
 
Marc Quinn is a British artist and part of the group known as Britartists or YBAs 
(Young British Artists). He is known for Alison Lapper Pregnant (a sculpture of Alison 
Lapper which has been installed on the fourth plinth at Trafalgar Square), Self (a sculpture of 
his head made with his own frozen blood), and Garden. As one of the Young British Artists, 
he is known for his innovative use of materials to make art, including blood, ice, faces, etc., 
his use of bringing scientific developments into art, and his designs for ‘discussion-
generating’ artworks. Quinn’s oeuvre displays a preoccupation with the mutability of the 
body and the dualisms that define human life: spiritual and physical, surface and depth, 
cerebral and sexual. Using an uncompromising array of materials, from ice and blood to glass, 
marble or lead, Quinn develops these paradoxes into experimental, conceptual works that are 
mostly figurative in form.30 I will focus my analysis on the Genomic Portrait of Sir John 




                                                           
29 More on the artist’s website: http://frederik-de-wilde.com/biography/ and in Artists Network Database: 
http://and.nmartproject.net/?p=1337. 
30 Information from: http://www.marcquinn.com/biography/. [2.05.2012]. 
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4.2. The classification of bio-portraits 
 
Tracking down the etymology of the genre of portrait in chapter 3, I was trying to show 
that it already contains the dynamic, never-ending story of the subject, ‘who is not one’ (pace 
mentioned before Irigaray and Haraway, who emphasize the intersectional character of 
personality; Irigaray in feminist, Haraway in posthuman vein; see more in 2.1.1.). The 
experience of living forms cannot give an image of ourselves as distinct subjects, as 
Colebrook commented on Deleuzian ideas (2002: 74). It rather shows that the experience of 
being a subject is highly inter-relative, symbiotic, commutative and permanently mediated by 
different power-relations. In the light of what has ju t been said in the previous chapters, the 
experience of being a subject has been changed and functions in-between discursive and 
material levels. So then the transfiguration becomes an effect of hegemonic power and agency 
of the subject creating, and of that being represented, which then acquires the representation. 
The coinage of bio-portrait is based upon the rearrangement of the previously indicated 
elements: the living/nonliving, grown/constructed, born/manufactured, and object/subject. 
The borders are blurred, the bio-portrait is actively rearranging itself throughout its 
metamorphoses —the metamorphoses of, oftentimes, a living entity, regarding for instance 
the works of Kac or Stelarc. Life —as vital processes and incessant relations with 
surroundings — is not only represented as a petrifid point in the taxonomy of knowledge, but 
also as perpetual change, which depends on particulr location in time and space — the 
processes of vegetation (a genetically modified flower) and assimilation (an artificial ear 
blending into a skin). These kinds of intra-species variations, which are prepared as art works, 
stand for me as the bio-portraits. Albeit, they do not represent one stable position of a single 
subject located in monoculture, but rather multiple subjectivities always ready to change 
themselves or to be changed by rearrangement of living conditions. 
Traditionally, the genre of portrait marked the social, ecclesiastical, class, monarchical, 
financial, etc. status quo of a poser. Portraits were made in order to emphasize financial 
stability, prosperity and prestige of a portrayed in ividual. There are some important changes 
in the evolution between portrait and bio-portrait: 
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1) Marking the end of the culture of thanatism, they are released from the mourning 
ceremony and eliminate the violent practice of universalization of the subject.31 
2) They re-territorialize, redefine and shift the borders between the biological, the 
technological and the human. 
3) As Deleuze argues, “the representation of embodied subjects is no longer visual in 
the sense of being scopic, in the post-Platonic sense of the simulacrum. Nor is it 
specular, in the psychoanalytic mode of redefining vision within a dialectical 
scheme of oppositional recognition of self and/as other. It has rather become 
schizoid, or internally disjointed […]” (qtd. in Braidotti 2006: 48). 
 
The modifications are present on different levels: 
 
1) level of portrayed (traditionally — object) 
2) level of portraying (traditionally — subject) 
3) level of audience (traditionally — passive) 
4) level of image (traditionally — stable effect). 
 
Therefore, as an effect of these translocations, portrait becomes an intersection of 
reinterpretations of representation. Nowadays, in post-individual times, Kevin Clarck uses 
a person’s specific genetic code to represent his models, believing that this allows him to 
perceive them without marking their social background. Dui Seid, a Chinese-American artist, 
thinks that a person’s DNA is a portrait of his ancestry and probably even his descendents and 
expresses that belief in his work titled Bloodlines. His family portrait dissolves into his own 
image then into a myriad of all ethnically diverse p ople before finally dissolving into his 
own DNA (see Andrews; Kac (ed.) 2007: 129). Marta de Menezes decided to take advantage 
of the visual opportunities offered by structural biology in order to create a self-portrait using 
proteins as an art medium (de Menezes; Kac (ed.) 2007: 221). Marc Quinn used DNA which 
was taken from sperm to prepare a portrait of sir John Sulston; Eduardo Kac implemented the 
                                                           
31 Agata Bielik-Robson (a Polish philosopher) in her work Wprowadzenie. Erros, albo życie problematyczne 
[Introduction. Erros, or, the dubious life] (2011) concludes that we are living in the Thanatic culture. Also 
Braidotti points the fixation of Thanatos in critical debates today, and notes, writing about ethics and Thanatos 
that “Death need not to be the ‘unproductive black hole’ [following Ansell-Pearson 1996:68] that we all fear, but 
rather a creative synthesis of flows, energies and becomings” (2006: 235). 
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flower’s capillaries by his own DNA taken from his blood; de Menezes and Frederik de 
Wilde made use of the newest technological tools to look inside bodies in order to present 
what normally cannot be presented. Furthermore, Stelarc used a soft prosthesis to 
permanently modify his body architecture, locating a  artificial ear on his forearm. 
All of the mentioned interventions and modifications of living bodily material have one 
specific attribute: cross-referencing between disciplines of art and science, but — I would say 
— on the level of complexity and accountability. They surpassed the simplified visions 
presented by Daria Martin or Jean Painlevé, where a personal narrator admires the 
intelligence, impressive memory, and capacity of the octopus to express their emotions 
(Painlevé, Les amours de la pieuvre/The Love Life of the Octopus, 1967), or the camera shows 
the mutual, bodily exploration of the naked dancer’s body with the non-antropomorphic 
robotic devices (Martin, Soft Materials, 1973). In spite of the fact that the robotic struc ures 
are shaped in a non-antropomorphic way, and the octopi is observed by immersive, but not 
interfering means, there is still a ‘distance-zone’ b tween human and non-human. The “in-
depth transformation of the dominant, unitary vision” (Braidotti 2006: 5) of coalescence of 
the variety of living subjects is not done yet. What is more, nature simultaneously reflects 
humanity, mirroring human emotions/feelings/situations. I think that we need an intervention 
instead of a simple mimicry. Among other determinants which indicate the bio-art trend, re-
shaping human subjectivity through encounters with other life-forms is the most general (and 
the most important) one. 
The works which I am going to analyze now were created about 30 years later than the 
ones described above; therefore, they imbibed the impact of new advanced technologies, 
which evolved during that time. I do not intend to create a full systematization of existing 
variations between human, robots and animals. Neverthel ss, I do want to show the 
metamorphoses of biodiverse representation, arranged particularly on the line between the 
portrait and the bio-portrait. The new bio-cartography of subjective transfigurations 
overcomes the danger of colonialist politics. It avoids the imperialist practice of appropriating 
new lands, dark continents of the unknown; it rather shows the process of amalgamation of 
different spaces and congeries. The permanent mutation nd the process of blending borders 
have a creative potential. That is why the map is never finished. The new cartographical 
approach gives a wanderer “a structure of complex dynamic equilibrium” (Rose; qtd. in 
Braidotti 2006: 6). It shows the conditions and representations of contemporary life at the 
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same time. Then, no one has to be afraid that there is nothing down below the paper (pace 
Baudrillard 1994: 132). 
Commenting on all the adumbrated in this and previous chapters of the conditions of the 
new class of representation, I will now present five different realizations of bio-portrait. 
I prepared the categorization of various issues which are encompassed by bio-art works, being 
aware of the fact that they are cross-referring to each other. Ranging from the most stable 
scans of human interior to the mutual, inter-bodily union of human and non-human, mediated 
by the technological apparatus, I will display the artistic exemplification of affinity with other 
organic and mechanic phenomena. 
I would like to divide the bio-art works which I am going to analyze into three 
categories, considering which one depends on the method being used for 
preparing/producing/creating them. The first one is focused on rearranging functions of 
traditional ways of representation by using the new t chnological apparatus: functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Functional Portraits by Marta de Menezes) and scanning 
electron microscopes and atomic force microscopes (Nano-Art by Frederik de Wilde). The 
second strategy is based on the hybridization of organisms, joining the human with non-
human elements by means of engineering a soft prosthesi  (the Medpor implant and 
a miniature microphone) in Stelarc’s project, and genetic engineering (Petunia and author’s 
DNA) in the Kac’s bio-art work. The third manner of portraying consists in multiplication of 
samples of DNA code by means of the cloning process. My concern is, as I stressed in the 
second chapter, to analyze the mediation between human and non-human agents on the 
organic and symbolic level, jointly creating bio-portraits. 
 
4.2.1. Functional portraits 
 
While elements of the portrait’s arrangement become an inflexible convention, artists 
look for different techniques to produce new languages and re-arrange old genres. In de 
                                                           
32 As Baudrillard writes in Simulacra and Simulation: “The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it 
survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes th  territory — precession of simulacra — that engenders the 
territory” (1994: 1). 
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Menezes’ case,33 the series of portraits was made by using the functio al Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI), which determines which regions of the brain are activated while a subject 
performs a given task. It is a type of specialized MRI scan used to measure the hemodynamic 
response (change in blood flow) related to neural activity in the brain or spinal 
cord of humans or animals. It is one of the most recently developed forms of neuroimaging. 
Portrayed persons were asked to mimic playing piano (Particia Figueiredo) or draw of the 
Gulbenkian Foundation’s gardens, while watching a photograph from the gardens and then 
changes of activities of their cerebral parts are reco ded. In de Wilde’s case, the Nano-Art 
project was visualized with tools like scanning electron microscopes and atomic force 
microscopes, and then processed by using various artistic techniques in order to convert them 
into art works.34 
Both of the projects are focused on exploration of the invisible world of the human 
body. However, the first one, by means of the new tchnology, shows a well-known shape of 
a human brain framed in facial physiognomy, while th  second work presents normally 
hidden shapes and molecular structures in a frame of landscapes and sculptures. One intends 
to portray a unique personal portrait, the second — to create a small aesthetic universe. 
 
These portraits, or any others of this series, include the face of the subject, the 
morphology of his/her brain and the active areas of the brain that relate the subject to the 
task they were performing inside the MRI machine. They have been displayed as digital 
pictures printed on canvas, or as video projections onto canvas that is used as a screen. 
(De Menezes [6.06.2011]) 
 
Interestingly, in the project of the Portuguese author, a physiognomy is joined with anatomy. 
The face is almost replaced by the brain mapping. The most important remark is that the 
notion of time is included in the images. The portrait is no longer a stable, monumental effigy, 
which pretends to give mirror-reflection of the portrayed model. As we will see, it shows 
more than a volatile gesture or an image of petrifid mimicry. Frederik de Wilde goes even 
further, exposing the nano-world and shattering ourrecognition of identifying common 
images.  
                                                           
33 The project is described and shown on the artist’s website: http://www.martademenezes.com/?page_id=102. 
[27.05.2012]. 
34 Detailed information about the project: http://frederik-de-wilde.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Nano-
Art.pdf. [27.05.2012]. 
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The Functional Portraits shows how insincere the conviction about stability of the 
subject is. Here the portrait (or self-portrait) neith r gives the solid, invariable image of 
a person, nor lays claims to ‘truth’, although it is supported by a scientific authority. De 
Menezes’ works present the activity of brain captured in a facial frame. The body-mind 
opposition is re-worked and re-conceptualized. What is noteworthy is that it is also marked as 
a female anatomy. The Woman as a phantasm was the most common representation in the 
bodily object often concerned with emotionality (even with hysteric symptoms35). Even the 
very structure of the human brain is used by research rs to show that there are fundamental 
gender differences and the perspective is arranged in favour of men36 (Fine 2011: XVII). The 
conglomerate of artistic views and medical elaborati ns has already labeled the feminine 
image; although by these days the feminist practice has unmasked the mechanism of 
oppression rooted in such reified images many times. B yond gender stereotypes, the Nano-
Art project plays with our illusionary way of understanding the visual by penetrating deeper 
inside the structure which creates images. The contextualization of this particular artwork 
within the rich history of painting and photography and the connection with old and new 
masters in traditional painting shows how fallacious our instant reaction and recognition are. 
Moreover, the medium of the exhibition itself was seen as a tool of an institutional 
legitimization and objectification of art works, whic  often eliminates a deliberate critical 
reflection on the content and manner of exhibited art. Final discovery of the actual subject of 
perception reveals a failure of the audience’s expectations.  
Works of both artists play at the intersection of two various levels — medical and 
phantasmal, artistic and scientific. I would like to use Lilie Chouliaraki’s term of the ‘multiple 
economy of representation’ and show how the portrait functions as a regulator and medium of 
multiple economies of emotions, technologies and phantasms. The question which 
                                                           
35 There is a long tradition in identifying women’s emotional economy with hysterical behavior. Ranging from 
Jean-Martin Charcot and his student, Sigmund Freud to contemporary diagnosis concerned with eating disor ers. 
More in feminist re-interventions in that field, for instance: Mad, Bad and Sad: A history of the mind doctors 
from 1800 to the present by Lisa Appignanesi, The Madwoman in the Attic: The woman writer and the
nineteenth-century literary imagination by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Madness and Medicine: The 
Graphomaniac’s Cure by Pamela White Hadas, The Female Malady: Women, madness and English culture 
1830-1980 by Elaine Showalter, and ‘Just as a scientific hypothesis: the literary language of madness in 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper”’ by Gerardo Rodríguez Salas. 
36 She writes more about that view: “There is also nothi g new about looking to the brain to explain and justify 
the gender status quo. In the seventeenth century, the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche declared women 
‘incapable of penetrating to truths that are slighty difficult to discover’ […] The neurological explanation for 
this, he proposed, lay in the ‘delicacy of the brain fibers’. Early brain scientists […] proposed that women’s 
intellectual inferiority stemmed from their smaller and lighter brains” (Fine 2011: XXIV-XXV), showing a 
continuum within the contemporary scientific and popular opinions.  
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immediately pops out while watching de Menezes’ works is: how does the portrait show the 
identity of the portrayed person? We obviously see thr e elements: face, morphology of the 
brain and changes of brain’s activity during certain t sks performed by the model. It is known 
that: 
 
[…] several areas of the human brain are involved in the analysis of the human face and 
that these areas may distinguish processing according to the functions of information they 
analyze. The analysis of the static features of faces, which convey identity and categorical 
information about faces, is probably carried out in a different part of the brain than 
analysis of the motions that carry social information. The processing of emotional 
information from the face is further differentiated neutrally. (O’Toole 2005: 349) 
 
According to this knowledge, the series of functional portraits becomes a kind of labyrinth of 
mirrors — the audience watches the recording of the neural work, at the same time using 
several parts of the brain to analyze the face which they are looking at, whereas de Wilde’s 
photographic project creates a system of inner labyrinths evoking architectural or fantasy 
spaces. Looking at them, we start asking questions: what do we see?, how do we see?, how 
do we understand what we see?37 Without preparation to receive an art-work which is made 
by nanotech, the question about difference between art and science, and art and information, 
is raised. Then we discover to what extent affectiv reception and rational recognition are 
combined. The series of works by those two artists unmask38 a whole variety of petrified 
conventions and prejudices which direct our interprtation of the world.  
Those statements seem to overcome the way of reading metaphysical portraits (facial 
images) and help to understand the project of this Portuguese artist. By the notion of 
metaphysical, I mean the one presented in Walter Benjamin’s or Ronald Barthes’ theories 
looking for undefined magical aura (Benjamin 1969) or punctum of the representation 
(Barthes 1981). Functional portraits, as its title suggests, is focused on function — as I will 
argue not only biological, but social as well,39 because “[b]odies take the shape of the very 
contact they have with objects and others” (Ahmed 2004: 1). The work of de Menezes shows 
                                                           
37 The questions raised by the author; http://frederik-de-wilde.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Nano-Art.pdf  
[27.05.2012]. 
38 The current series by de Wilde is even called Un[masked]. 
39 In the Umwelt statement Frederik de Wilde wrote: “All technologies are social technologies”, explaining that 
he is “[…] very much interested in how technologies can be rendered into social technologies and create a 
potential for change”. Frederik de Wilde: Invisible Boundary Between Art & Science. An interview of Silvia 
Bertolotti. http://www.digicult.it/digimag/article.asp?id=2180. [21.05.2012]. 
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how the surface of a body changes when it is being asked to encounter objects (garden or 
imaged piano). The body is thus shown not as a monolithic unity which determines the 
liveable space for the subject and his/her possibilities, but as a machine-in-motion. Of course 
this trope leads us a long way to Descartes and his vis on of a body-machine driven by 
Newton’s forces and further to the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. I believe that 
Functional portraits goes beyond this binarism. Rather those images rework the traditional 
notion of the mythical, mysterious female body, unbridled and unpredictable. This 
presumption did not end with the dusk of the Victorian regime.40 Ahmed reminds that 
“[f]eminist philosophers have shown us how the subordination of emotions also works to 
subordinate the feminine and the body” (2004: 3). Marta de Menezes shifts the order — the 
brain mapping on both images is framed by woman’s face — and shows that it is only 
a seemingly non-gendered image. In fact, those works give different representation and state 
an active role of the gendered body. Most often, the depictions of bodies catch the whole of 
silhouettes, not showing the internal organs. On the contrary — analyzed diptych shows what 
is inside, not outside the body, cutting off a huge part of the figures. What is more — it goes 
a step further than the Irigarian proposition of female morphology as a corpus of new 
imaginary, showing not the morphology of genital organs, but of the brain and map of its 
activity while performing a certain task. Importantly, the task characterizes her (like drawing 
characterizes de Menezes or playing piano characterizes Patricia).  
According to cognitive researchers, emotions do not play first fiddle in the mechanism 
of emotional reactions, an elaboration of the theory of William James and Carl Lange — they 
say that emotions arise after recognizing somatic reactions. So then emotions become the 
answer for bodily behavior caused by some external reason. Here, reason is the task, which 
the portrayed persons perform. Emotions cannot be deciphered without knowledge about 
morphology of the brain. It is more likely that they are interpreted from the faces of models. 
Notwithstanding, cerebral depictions call into question those simple interpretations. Thus the 
works of de Menezes and de Wilde show how false the reading of omnipresent 
representations can be. Ahmed in her text on cultural politics of emotions also argues that 
political and social discourse is based on the bodily and emotional metaphors which are signs 
of subordination of the Others: 
 
                                                           
40 Fine notes that “the phenomenon that came to be wid ly known among the Victorian public” was “the missing 
five ounces of the female brain” (2011: XXIV). 
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We can see from this language that evolutionary thinking has been crucial to how 
emotions are understood: emotions get narrated as a sign of ‘our’ prehistory, as a sign of 
how the primitive persists in the present. The Darwinian model of emotions suggests that 
emotions are not only ‘beneath’ but ‘behind’ the man/human, as a sign of earlier and 
more primitive times. (2004: 3) 
 
In fact, contemporary cognitivists working on the evolution of encephalic tissues also agree 
that ‘emotional economy’ is located in evolutionary older parts of the brain. It was also 
mentioned that the Victorian culture and early psychoanalytic work marked emotions in 
a similar way. But — what is most important — this critical discourse shows how the 
medical/scientific/evolutionist knowledge is already a kind of interpretation of the results. 
Functional portraits re-presents to me (and denoted hyphen is significat) emotions as 
unavoidable activity: neural and cultural as well. I think that it does not fall into the pitfall of 
the model of ‘emotional intelligence’, which Ahmed also writes about — they are not tools 
which can be used by the subject in the project of life. They are ‘re-presented’ because of the 
mechanism of double-imaging: showing the neural background of transformation and the 
cultural context of interpreting the physical process. Work shows the functional analysis of 
the brain, but it facilitates only conclusions about a laterality (division of two cerebral 
hemispheres) and activities of certain parts of the brain which are responsible for other tasks 
(optical, motor, aural, emotional, etc.). Regardless of that fact, the portraits are located within 
the frame of female physiognomy, what gives immediat ly the context of cultural 
representations of women. The interpretations of raw images — fMRI results: functional 
magnetic resonance imaging — would be a medical analysis of pathological changes. Here, 
as works of art, they are inevitably placed within the history of art and metamorphoses of 
female images. In the light of the previous reflection about the hysterical status of a woman 
being a hostage of the Victorian jail, works of thePortuguese artist call up associations with 
disorders, the pathological condition of the female body, but are instantly overcome. There is 
adumbrated joyfulness — instead of madness and sickness. Hence, the multiple economy of 
the portrait consists of a polemic character of presented images as genres and particularly — 
women’s representations. 
The work of Frederik de Wilde projects a wider persctive on human mechanism of 
recognition, making all the crude prejudices questionable. The notions of nanosculptures or 
nanolandscapes repeat the traditional figurative forms of art, but in fact they portray living 
and non-living cells without giving a clue about their origins. The contextualization within 
a frame of history of art, particularly creating a connection with old and new masters in 
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traditional painting, directs our perception to aesth tic experience of symmetrical, 
harmonious arrangement of elements, use of light, and the diagonal lines, which build the 
construction of the image. For instance, the vertical alignment of nanotubes of carbon is 
supposed to be a relative at the artistic level of the carbon that one finds in charcoal pens or 
in pencils. The effect of Nano-Art reminds of the old visual experiments; for example, th  
well-known picture of the cord of dolphins and lovers. The perception of one or the other 
dimension of the image depends on the cultural background of the viewer: at a first glance, 
children see dolphins, but adults recognize lovers. De Wilde’s project reveals a very similar 
mechanism: it hides the microparticles scanned by electron microscope and atomic force 
microscope by visualizing them in mode which reminds of ancient or avant-garde techniques 
of drawing or painting.  
The series by Marta de Menezes and Frederik de Wilde stands for me as a suitable 
example for a ‘new representation’ or ‘figuration’ being in-demand within the latest feminist 
critical theory (not yet a ‘transfiguration’). As Braidotti explains: “Figurations are not 
figurative ways of thinking, but rather more materialistic mapping of situated or embedded 
and embodied, positions” (2002: 2). Both works join in the most noticeable way the 
materialistic and representative level of subject/ivity. They show that one is born and becomes 
a woman in defiance of Simone de Beauvoir’s claim, or in a wider perspective: that the 
content of image comes into being through an interpretation. A biological entity that has 
undergone fMRI testing is not represented as a free om cultural layers being. Even 
registered emotions have to be seen as a cultural practice, not only recording of change in 
blood flow. Biological functions of the brain are shown through neuroimaging, but the object 
of scrutiny is already embodied and framed as an art wo k. Hence, the new representation 
proposed by de Menezes has a lot in common with Chouliaraki’s proposition of “performative 
capacity of representation: its capacity not only to re-present the world to its audiences but 
also to propose to them how to think and feel about the world” (2008: 838). The audience 
does not get the transparent image realized in well-known, old, used-many-times convention, 
but rather, it is rich in intertextual streams work which connects scientific and artistic layers.  
Woman is no longer represented as an object of the gaz inseparably linked with male 
desire. The subject which creates portraits does not look at a model and imitates caught-in-a-
while-image, but arranges the lab-art studio and puts the results of medical investigation into 
cultural context. Furthermore, the audience does not stay passive, encountering such 
functional portraits. Hence, the portrait as a stable confirmation of social status, provocation 
of sexual desires or sacral legitimization is replaced by the record of various vital processes. 
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All of those factors need a separate cartography of changes. Notwithstanding, it is clearly 
shown that representation of a body that is always at least bi-layered (apart from the physical 
dimension, even within medical sources) is already culturally interpreted (even when we take 
into account emotional reactions). Functional portraits present a broad set of a portrayal’s 
functions. The exploration of them is determined by the cultural space-time dimension of the 
researcher. 
 
4.3.2. Hybridized portraits 
 
Edunia is the central part of the Natural History of the Enigma (which encompasses 
a large-scale public sculpture, a print suite, photographs, and other works) of Eduardo Kac, 
first exhibited in 2009 at the Weisman Art Museum in Minneapolis. Edunia is a genetically-
engineered flower that is a hybrid of Kac and Petunia, which was developed between 2003 
and 2008. A sample of Kac’s blood was drawn and subsequently isolated a genetic sequence 
which is part of the artist’s immune system (distinguishing self from non-self, and protecting 
against foreign molecules, disease, invaders). Then t is sequence was integrated into the 
chromosome of the Edunia, which means that it is genetically transferable.  
Ear on Arm by Stelarc is a third part of Engineering Internet Organ, which has been 
ongoing for 12 years now. The first part — the Extra Ear was firstly imaged as an ear on the 
side of the head. The 1/4 Scale Ear involved growing small replicas of his ear using living 
cells, while the Ear on Arm project began the surgical construction of a full-sized ear on 
Stelarc’s forearm, one that would transmit the sounds it hears (see Stelarc). While having 
received surgeries, many medical problems emerged, but finally the implemented project has 
effectively become an Internet organ for the body. 
Those two works perform different functions (one is an object of aesthetic admiration; 
the second functions in the technological and media terrain, conducting sounds). However, 
they stand together as a technological bestiary41 containing ‘technoteratogens’ — the entities 
which do not fit in the normative evolutionary orde. Therefore, such “[s]ubjects are alive, 
free, and autonomous. From bacteria to bunnies, from frogs to flowers, living organisms 
                                                           
41 See also: G. M. Gatti From The Technological Herbarium (1) - Telegarden by Ken Goldberg. 
http://www.noemalab.org/sections/ideas/ideas_articles/pdf/shapiro_excerpts_01.pdf.  [19.05.2012]. 
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grown or bred in unique ways, modified or invented by artists, are the elements of a true art of 
evolution” (Kac; Kac (ed.) 2007: 14). The notion of evolution (as an inevitable, linearly 
progressive process) is replaced by the ‘art of evolution’,42 which eliminates the elements of 
inevitability and lack of external agency and by means of that it overcomes the mechanism of 
naturalization of new subjects emerging. The new continuous evolution is happening on the 
level between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, and gives the glimpse of a new real (see Shapiro 
2010). 
The ‘new real’ is being differently embodied. The two, chosen by me, are examples that 
show two various ways of incorporating non-human agents. The first created by Kac is an 
organic flower with human DNA. What is being generat d and experienced by Stelarc “is not 
the biological other — but an excessive technological other, a third other” (see Stelarc). Both 
projects are effects of human agency but reappraised by the participation of outer elements. 
Throughout the process of living-with they become hybridities containing bodily architecture 
of different beings, adopting their vital functions, and extending operational/living systems of 
one species. The question is to which extent the reciprocity of human and non-human is 
achieved (Hoving 2005: 157; see chapter 2). 
Edunia expresses his DNA exclusively in its red veins.43 Apparently, it seems to be an 
ideal visualization of the notion of hybridity and a result of reciprocal cooperation between 
human and non-human dimensions of life. De facto, when we look deeper into that matter, 
we will notice that the human DNA is shaped after the anthropological example — located in 
veins, which reminds us of our circulatory system, specially when we take into account the 
red color of the capillaries. Furthermore, the purpose of Edunia is to show how close 
humankind is to the other species, which Kac describes as the one of ‘the wildest dreams’. 
Eventually, it becomes an image which mimics human anatomy. Moreover, the creator is 
outside his work, so then the project becomes an external self-portrait made in the likeness of 
him. However, at the same time, it is an excessive crossbreed other — partially flower, 
partially human. On the one hand, it expresses a contiguity of life between different species, 
as the author wants, but on the other hand, it show a hegemonic status of the human. The 
method used in the process of creation of this hybridized entity becomes even more 
significant, regarding the paradoxical double-edge int rpretation. Kac’s IgG DNA responsible 
                                                           
42 However throughout the invasive evolution, which seems to be non-invasive, there are also different examples 
of chimeric organisms: the humanimal worlds of dogs, chickens, turtles, and wolves; and in fugal, microbial, 
symbiogenetic counterpoint, the acacia trees of Africa, the Americas, Australia, and the Pacific Islands, with 
their congeries of associates reaching across taxa. See Haraway 2010: 1. 
43 More about work of Kac: http://www.ekac.org/nat.hist.enig.html. [5.02.2010]. 
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for the identification and rejection of foreign bodies was located in the flower vascular 
system. Eventually, the genetic hybridity becomes a very complicated human-flower being, 
where the part of the human immunological system normally fighting against external 
invaders is incorporated in the system of external living organism. On the symbolic level — 
the method of molecular manipulation produces the eff ct of overcoming the apparently 
insurmountable mechanism of exclusion or marginalizing the Others. 
The Ear on Arm also stands as a hybridity, but joins the human with the technological. 
As Stelarc describes, it manifests a desire to deconstruct our evolutionary architecture (see 
Stelarc). However it uses the technique of soft prosthesis and becomes a permanent 
modification of the body architecture. The project does not deliver a promise of filling in the 
missing bodily parts, but it is rather a symptom of excess. What is more important — the 
additional ear located on the forearm becomes not oly a living sculpture and skin expansion, 
but also a medium which transmits sounds by integraing microminiaturized electronics inside 
the ear and distributes via the Bluetooth system. This strategy definitely opens up new vistas 
onto reappraisal of the notion of subjectivity and agency. The subject literary becomes 
a collective form, because the borders of skin or of having to be in proximity are no longer 
compulsory and insurmountable. There is a physical collaboration of different subjects within 
a frame of a single body, which becomes “an available, accessible and mobile organ for other 
bodies in other places, enabling people to locate and listen in to another body elsewhere” (see 
Stelarc). Those technological inventions do not only parallel the shift in focus that has 
occurred within human needs. They extend the functio al ty, becoming phantom positions of 
new subjects, no longer kept in the prison of time and space, no longer depending on single-
sense organs. Again, it is worth emphasizing that te representation goes beyond the scopic 
paradigm of recognition of self (see 2.3 and 4.2). Stelarc’s project exceeds even the level 
which I have called ‘inner voyeurism’, scoping out DNA, proteins, cells, and organisms, 
transgressing former stable borders which regulate the social order. It does transgress the 
traditional social order where singular positions of individuality are considered as personal 
capital, changing them into fluctuations of life-forms, transmissions of data, into a flow of 
sensorial inter-subjective experiences. 
The new transfigurations of human-animal (mediated by technological tools) and 
human-technological hybridities become self-portraits, “transformative account of the self” 
(Braidotti 2002: 3), re-mediated representations of their creators on the one hand, but on the 
other hand they are a continuum of the life of those subjects, perpetually changing entities 
49 
containing external elements of non-human world. Through the prism of representational 
theories, we can see how they express the desire to forge bonds of stability, a one-dimensional 
surface of image, time and space limitations and actualize trans-species and transgenic 
interconnections in a physical realization and symbolic gesture at once. 
 
4.3.3. Multiplied portrait 
 
The Genomic Portrait of Sir John Sulston by its title clearly indicates the genre of the 
presented work. The techniques of making such an image are, however, entirely different 
from traditional ones. The main strategy of creation — and this concept is also significant in 
the light of the following reflections — is based on multiplying DNA code.44 British artist 
Marc Quinn used in his work standard methods for DNA cloning. He portrayed a Nobel prize-
winning scientist, who is a central figure in the dvelopment of DNA analysis. DNA of this 
key figure in the development of the analysis of DNA and definition of the human genome 
was broken randomly into segments and treated so that they could be replicated in bacteria. 
The bacteria containing the DNA segments were spread out on agar jelly in the plate that you 
see in the portrait. The transparent entities are colonies of bacteria, each grown from a single 
cell containing a part of Sulston’s DNA; at the point of visibility their growth was stopped.45 
The portrait of the star of genetic research is built on multiplication of his own DNA, taken 
from the sperm — which is also significant — and hyberbolized through forced bacteria to 
grow.  
The strategy of multiplication is multilayered. First of all, it is based on the DNA 
cloning procedure, which reflects a kind of cross-fertilization. The process of spreading out 
the bacteria with DNA segments in some way evokes ejaculation. Second of all, the single 
portrait becomes a double mirror, a diptych of two charismatic persons working with genetics: 
                                                           
44 Nobel prize-winning scientist, who is a central figure in the development of DNA analysis. After receiving his 
BA and PhD from Pembroke College, Cambridge, Sulston was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Salk Institute, San 
Diego from 1966 until 1969. In 1969 he joined the Mdical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology, 
Cambridge, where he researched the cellular and genetic structure of the tiny nematode worm, C. elegans. From 
1992 until 2000 he was Director of the Sanger Centre, Cambridge, working on the Human Genome Project to 
decode the human genetic sequence. In 2002 Sulston co-wrote, with Georgina Ferry. The Common Thread: A 
Story of Science, Politics, Ethics and the Human Genome.  
http://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/person/mp59340/sir-john-edward-sulston [12.05.2012]. 
45 More about the project: http://www.npg.org.uk/beyond/exhibitions/touring/past/a-genomic-portrait.php. 
[9.04.2011 r.]. 
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Sulston and Quinn. Quinn’s laudation, however, explicitly also contains his own portrait. As 
already mentioned, Richard notes: “[t]he representation of other […] invariably entails the 
presentations of self-portraits, in that those people who are observed are overshadowed or 
eclipsed by the observer” (1994: 298). And third of all, the portrait of Sir John Sulston stands 
as a variation on the fantasy of self-birth, where “th  mind replac[es] the womb as the site of 
procreation” (Braidotti 2006: 102). The mechanism of reproduction is one of the core-issues 
of contemporary technology (and bio-politics in Fouca ldian words).  
 
[R]eproduction, which is by now technologically assisted to a very large extent, provides 
the experimental ground for unique forms of experimntation. These are integral to bio-
technological capital, but this does not prevent them from offering potential new forms of 
social relations and kinship. (Braidotti 2006: 100) 
 
The work of Quinn has the potential to show these new forms of social relations and 
inter-species kinship, although it does not meet th requirement of relinquishing the dualism 
of male–female, and further human–non-human. It is directly connected with the notion of 
gender and — as an effect — produces ‘racial discourse’ in the forms of hybridities produced 
by human. Marc Quinn’s work treats it explicitly by means of reproduced sperm. The most 
important aspect is the usage of bacterial colonies. As specialists say: “[t]his is done using 
a vector which carries things between species. In the case of using bacteria, the vector is the 
plasmid which is a circle of DNA found in bacterial cytoplasm. It can easily be opened up and 
a DNA fragment inserted into it”.46 However, it combines two circles of DNA — bacterial 
and human ones — the bacterial round helix (it is a material which includes the DNA) 
becomes only a container for the human DNA sampled from the sperm. There is a link 
between women and animals (here bacterial colonies), where women “personify the animal–
human continuity, while men embody its discontinuity” (Braidotti 2006: 104). Women stand 
only as objects of exchange, whereas men manage reproductive capital. What is more, 
the sperm is burdened with lots of representational connotations — such as a spermatozoon as 
a hero47 — which makes me think about the really traditional overtone of Quinn’s work — 
a monument of a great scholar in a new form, replacing the bronze artifacts, which have been 
the most prestigious form of reward.  
                                                           
46 Genetic Engineering. http://scienceaid.co.uk/biology/genetics/engineering.html. [6.04.2011]. 
47 More about research on that theme: E. Martin: “The Egg and the Sperm. How Science has constructed a 
Romance based on stereotypical male-female Roles”. In: Signs, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Spring, 1991), pp. 485-501. 
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The strategy of multiplication then becomes a multi-copy of the traditional 
representations of humans; however, they are closed in a technologically advanced form. The 
form does not destabilize the traditional view on the monolithic subject, and even fulfills the 
etymological designation, metaphorically becoming a cord used to truss people and animals 
(see more in chapter 3). Furthermore, it reproduces th  tatus quo position of the human as 
a colonizer of nature. Although the non-human element is incorporated in and united with 
human form, and it is not seen as an ‘outer other’, it functions only as a container which 
makes DNA visible and grown. There is no transgression of former stable borders which 
regulate the social order.  
 
4.3.4. Critical remarks 
 
Going through the posthuman path of reflection, organized around rethinking and 
destabilizing anthropocentrism, it is rather a matter for intersectional rewriting, 
reconceptualizing within postmodern theory, rereading through the theory of science and the 
other way round. Furthermore, we are oscillating on the ground of the politics of 
representations. Therefore, Derridean criticism on traditional representation of animals can be 
very useful here. As Haraway notices: 
 
Derrida correctly criticized two kinds of representations, one set from those who observe 
real animals and write about them but never meet their gaze, and the other set from those 
who engage animals only as literary and mythological f gures. (2008: 21) 
 
We have been faced with another kind of representatio  (joining these two mentioned 
streams): figurative and material at the same time. This was a case of reifying real animals 
and giving them the shape of a metaphor for the highest human desires (of immortality, 
evolutionary manipulations, reproductive control). Haraway is writing about the danger of 
falling into the trap concerned with making the subaltern (so here: animal) speak (following 
Spivak’s theory mentioned before; Haraway 2008: 20). The question is: if and how the 
challenge is accepted by the artists. On the one had, all those works can be seen as an image 
of human hegemony, treating the non-human world only as an extension of the former one. In 
other words, the concept which unites all these works can be simply understood as trying to 
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colonize nature (here represented by living organisms and different species). To quote 
Haraway one more time: 
 
The discursive tie between the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, and the animal — 
all reduced to type, all Others to rational man, and ll essential to his bright constitution 
— is at the heart of racism and flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism. Woven 
into that tie in all the categories is “woman’s” putative self-defining responsibility to “the 
species”, as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function. 
(2008: 18) 
 
The question of reproduction seems to me to be the crucial and ambiguous point indicated by 
the artists. Using bacteria and the flower as containers of human DNA amounts to the human 
exceptionarism — being an entity who is able to administer, create, change other non-human 
beings because of its exception — uniqueness and exclusion.  
Going back to the mentioned notion of an art in Deleuzian way of understanding: 
do these examples of bio-art works create new forms of life? Does this kind of art open up 
new possibilities for reciprocity between human and non-human entities? Or is it only a new 
form of colonialism of nature? As the author of When species meet has written: “Nature is 
only the raw material of culture appropriated, prese ved, enslaved, exalted, or otherwise made 
flexible for disposal by culture in the logic of capitalist colonialism” (Haraway 1988: 592). It 
can be said that nature is treated as a surface, which can be patterned, used, modified, in order 
to achieve some results by the humankind and these bio-art hybridities locate animal parts on 
the position of otherness, which is shared with referents such as women or racialized Others. 
So then there would be no ‘sym-bio-genesis’ unfortuna ely. But it can also be seen as an 
effect of overcoming the apparently insurmountable mechanism of exclusion or marginalizing 
the Others, as I said before. The presented works perform the given differently by the new 
trans-specific ethics tasks. Some of them only duplicate the boundaries between human and 
non-human, already gendered, worlds (Quinn), the otrs ably balance on the line between 
techno-organic levels (Kac, Stelarc), yet others disprove general misrecognitions made by 
human (de Menezes & de Wilde). 
Now then, is this “[…] the Man-making tale of the hunter on a quest to kill and bring 
back the terrible bounty” (Haraway 2010: 2) or the nomad-making tale of the newcomer on 
























































































































The temptation to call my work a genesis and synthesis of bio-art transformations has 
been rejected. Neither genesis nor synthesis is an adequate notion of what I have done. 
Moreover, it was said many times that it is rather a cartographical mode which supports any 
reconnaissance of contemporary subjective metamorphoses. In that case, it cannot be genesis 
either, because it evokes a Christian and highly anthropocentric fantasy of human origins, 
and, furthermore, a vision of Man as a Master of all beings.  
It has to have an open ending because the world of techno-science has been instantly 
and constantly changing. New technologies become immediately used as new tools of art 
practice. Furthermore, the projects already presentd are being continuously improved. The 
famous oncomouse has got a new companion: kidney-mouse, brainbow mouse, cancer-
resistant mouse, mighty mice, and fearless mouse. That is why a contribution to the 
cartography of transfigurations can never be complete and finished, fulfilled and irreversibly 
systematized. By means of that, the new bio-cartography of subjective transfigurations 
overcomes the danger of colonialist politics. It avoids the imperialist practice of appropriating 
new land, the dark continents of the unknown, instead showing the process of amalgamation 
of different spaces and congeries. The permanent mutation and the process of blending 
borders have a creative potential. 
The axis of my reflection was designated by the discredited notion of representation, 
which has been already transformed into renewed concepts: a new representation (Andrews), 
figuration (Braidotti, Haraway), transfiguration (ibid.) or even biotransfiguration (Bakke). 
The axis is two-directional (and as a horizontal axis cannot be hierarchical), which I have 
been repeating constantly. It joins fantasy with technoreality (chapter 2), metaphors and 
machines, software and hardware, saying and doing, a d in general — science and language 
studies (chapter 2), subject with object position, material and formal figures (chapter 3), 
science (biology and technology) and art in general. 
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The fundamental relation between self and other has its origin in the process of 
metaphorization of the abnormal entities: the allegorical, moralist, and parabolic stories which 
have founded the paradigm of teratology. As we have seen throughout the conducted analysis, 
the monsters have been made real and they have become a part of the community again by 
banishing the overwhelming social fear of abnormality. The presented bio-art works which 
provide alternative figurations or schemes of representations have the potential not only to 
cause fear, but also to empower the newly created subjects. “The interaction or mediation 
between the self and […] imaginary institutions provides the motor for the process of 
becoming-subject” (Braidotti 2006: 86) and also the other way round, the process of 
becoming-subject activates the mechanism of changes on the imaginary level. This way the 
trap of a one-sided, unidirectional way of seeing art as a mirror-reflection of reality or the 
reality as an imitation of life (pace Baudrillard 1994) is overcome. Thus, the mediation 
between art and reality emerges in a new shape.  
Art has reformulated the functions which have been obtained for many centuries now: 
the didactic function and the role of social commitment have gone through great 
transformations of aesthetics–ethics distinction. Not only does it keep up with the 
development of science, but it also precedes it, showing possibilities for new-life adaptation. 
The art practice has come to the point where it no lo ger represents reality, but it transfigures 
and transcends it. Therefore, my analysis shows the presented works as effects of 
sociopolitical power relations and the way of their transformations, which indicates an 
alternative conceptual framework. This framework shows new ethical renegotiations which 
are concerned with changes of the concept of subjectivity (Others are no longer located on the 
position of an object) and stands as a basis for new bio-politics understood finally in 
empowering, not simply restrictive terms. 
The notion of bio-art is surrounded by similar compounds: the concepts of bio-politics 
(Foucault), bio-logic (Bec), and nature-culture (Haraway). They are different conceptual 
realizations of new post-individual politics of subjectivity. The process of constructing 
identity has been inevitably transformed. In 1999 “about 10% of the current U.S. population 
are estimated to be cyborgs in the technical sense” (Hayles 1999: 115); also in the 90’s, the 
Human Genome Project started. After two decades, resea chers have started wondering if it 
has become a standard and routine use in the care of h althy individuals (Brunham, Hayden 
2012). After all, the technological apparatus like prosthesis, denture, artificial skin, electronic 
cigarettes, lenses, implants, etc. used to maximize human potential, have also become new 
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factors of subjectivization. Then a new axis of differentiation is added: except for 
sexualization and racialization, there is also an axis of naturalization (see Braidotti 2006: 62), 
which is being overcome by presented art practice and collection of feminist philosophies. 
Therefore, bio-cartography corroborates the general shift towards genetic manipulations 
in scientific development and marks a step towards rehabilitation of representational thought. 
Thus, we can see that the various bodily functions are united in artistic activities, where the 
body not only stands as the Saussurean linguistic sign which contains a phonic and ideational 
element, but also as a fleshy material, which evokes many implications concerned with its 
vital functions. At this point of intersection there is a space for new questions and new 
analogies. Haraway has already drawn an analogy between oncomouse and Irigaray’s hysteria 
or matrix (2008); Braidotti has marked out the line between Deleuze and specifics of écriture 
féminine (2002). The horizon of further research is delineated on the crossroads of language 
and body, united into a (self-)representation.  
In the next step of my research I would like to work n the concept of écriture féminine 
(Hélène Cixous), parler femme (Luce Irigaray), or writing as a Woman (Corine Blackmer) 
which stand for me as a specific kind of representation as well. The variously named project 
has a whirlwind history. Preceded by Robert Grave’s conclusion about specific language of 
the goddess in the 1940’s (which we can name the ‘prefeminist’ reflections; 1948), in the 
1970’s it was elaborated by the ‘French wing’, which has taken feminist literary theory by 
storm (Julia Kristeva, Irigaray, Cixous, later also Marguerite Duras and Bracha Ettinger, 
instead of complications within their own nomenclature) and finally approached to film 
theory (Cathrine Portuges). I would like to show how the notion of female/feminine/feminist 
writing can be newly approached to literature and how it becomes a version of new 
representationalism. The presentation of diverse feminine figurations which will be analyzed 
from the perspective of this material turn could overcome the paradigm of axiological 
neutrality of the conducted research. Its aim would be to uncover the inter-relations between 
discursive and social practice, which undermine the s atus quo of female subjects in this case. 
The project would join the literary and the social-material dimension. In this regard, the 
category of écriture féminine on the one hand reflects existing differences within societies 
(potestas), all the while offering the possibility of transforming power relations once they are 
uncovered (potential). Moreover, this theoretical project will aim to produce knowledge about 
phenomena which are fundamental factors in the process of subjectivization and community 
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building and to examine the worlds created in poetry against the background of real 
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